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Recent actions and strategies by the EU institutions in the area of social policy
sensu lato reveal an increase in the use of complementary¹ or rather alternative
methods of regulation that enhance diversity and pave the way towards what
I define as a ‘transverse form of policy-making’.² This new process draws upon
a trans-national multi-tiered form of governance³ and basis of self-regulation,⁴
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¹ See EC Commission White Paper on EU Governance COM(2001)428, 20–2.
² Confront this definition with the broader notions of ‘flexibility’ or ‘differentiated integration
process’. See EC Commission, ‘Targeted Socio-Economic Research, I—Guidance note relating to
the work programme 1996’ (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities,
Luxembourg, 1996) 4 and 10, where the concept of ‘transversality’ is used to highlight the interac-
tion between the different elements/themes of the Fourth Framework programme (1994–8);
N. Walker, ‘Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union’ (1998) 4 ELJ 355–88;
C.D. Ehlermann, ‘Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Co-operation: The New Provisions of the
Amsterdam Treaty’ (1998) 4 ELJ 246–70; F. Tuytschawer, Differentiation in European Union Law
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999). The different terminology does not entail a conceptual difference.
Both terms in fact describe the gradual shift towards a multi-tiered system of policy-making at the
European level. The difference lies in the fact that while ‘transverse form of policy-making’ refers
specifically to the implementation of EU policies, and for the purpose of the present chap., to EU
social policy, ‘differentiation’ describes the development of the European integration process as a
whole and should be contextualized within the ongoing debate on whether the EU is a polity as
such. See C. Barnard, ‘Flexibility and Social Policy’ in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds.), Constitutional
Change in the EU, From Uniformity to Flexibility (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000), 4.
³ See I.-J. Sand, ‘Understanding the New Forms of Governance: Mutually Interdependent,
Reflexive, Destabilised and Competing Institutions’ (1998) 4 ELJ 276–86; A. Benz and B. Eberlein,
‘Regions in European Governance: The Logic of Multi-Level Interaction’, Working Paper RSC
No. 98/31 (online), available at: www.iue.it/ERPA/Mainfiles/../../RSC/wp-Text/98_31.html.
⁴ COM(2001)428, 20, where self-regulation is referred to as one of the complementary tools to
legislation.
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co-regulation,⁵ voluntary networks, and more specifically on the interaction
of actors distributed across the various levels of policy-making. It is articul-
ated upon ‘co-operative and horizontal’⁶ forms of subsidiarity and proximity.⁷
The literature concerning the study of these recent developments, both from
a political science and a legal perspective, is abundant.⁸ According to Ladeur’s
autopoietic theory,⁹ the process is moving from a ‘hierarchy of norms to the
heterarchy of changing patterns of legal inter-relationships’, i.e., a system
where the existing bottom-to-top mobilization leads to the creation of a dis-
tributed order strictly connected to its own ‘process of self-generation’, and
which is not based on a ‘fundamental unity nor on a universal rationality’.¹⁰ In
the context of legal theory, Pernice describes the European Union as being a
form of ‘multi-level constitutionalism’, i.e., ‘a divided power system, in which
each level of government, regional (or Länder), national (State) and suprana-
tional (European), reflects one or two or more possible political identities of
the citizens concerned, i.e. different levels of society’.¹¹ In addition, Pernice
introduces the concept of ‘European multi-level constitution’, defining it as
the sum of the constitutions of the Member States linked to one another
through supranational constitutional norms of the European Treaties (Verfa-
ssungsverbund) and which ‘bridges the apparent conflict between European
constitutionalism and the constitutionalism of the Member States’.¹²
Swyngedouw, in referring to ‘glocalization’—by merging the two words ‘global-
ization’ and ‘local’—emphasizes how globalization is fostering the promotion
of bottom-to-top processes and thus enhancing new forms of governance.¹³
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⁵ ‘Co-regulation combines binding legislative and regulatory action within actions taken by
the actors most concerned, drawing on their practical expertise’: COM(2001)428, 21, where the
Commission has also outlined the conditions for its application.
⁶ For a definition of horizontal subsidiarity see G. de Búrca, ‘Reappraising Subsidiarity’s
Significance after Amsterdam’, Jean Monnet Working Paper, No. 7/99, 6 (online), available at:
www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/paers/99/990702.htm.
⁷ Decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the grass roots level. See C. Paterman,
Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970), who refers
to proximity in order to develop a more democratic workplace; see also N. Bernard, ‘Legitimising
EU Law: Is the Social Dialogue the Way Forward? Some reflections Around the UEAPME Case’ in
J. Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing, Oxford,
2000), 292, who defines proximity as having three meanings: according to the territorial level, it
refers to decentralization or devolution of power; secondly it represents a bridge between the
public and private spheres of policy-making; thirdly, it refers to the matter or subject of decision-
making, issues that are close to the citizen’s daily experience.
⁸ For detailed analysis of governance issues see various studies available online at: http://
europa.eu.int/comm/governance/index_en.htm.
⁹ See K.-H. Ladeur, ‘The Theory of Autopoiesis as an Approach to Better Understanding
pf Post-modern Law, From the Hierarchy of Norms to the Heterarchy of Changing Patterns of
Legal Inter-relationships’, EUI Working Paper, Law series, No. 99/3, 6–18 available online at:
www.iue.i/PUB/law_fm.html. ¹⁰ Ibid., 10–11.
¹¹ See I. Pernice, ‘Multi-level Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European
Constitution-Making Revised?’ (1999) 36 CMLRev. 706. ¹² Ibid., 307.
¹³ See E. Swyngedouw, ‘The Mammon Quest: “Glocalisation,” Interspatial Competition and the
Monetary Order: The Construction of New Scales’ in M. Dunford and G. Kaflakis (eds.), Cities and
Regions in the New Europe (Belhaven Press, London, 1992), 39–67.
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Finally, Rosenau refers to ‘fragmigration’ to describe the enmeshment of
integration and fragmentation at the global level.¹⁴
The main challenge with which the European Union is confronted lies in
bridging the gap between these new trans-national forms of policy-making
and its democratic deficit/legitimacy crisis.¹⁵ Civil society and social partners
are called to play an important part in ‘shaping and delivering EU policy’¹⁶ at
the national level.¹⁷ Participatory democracy and deliberative supranational-
ism, as opposed to representative democracy and democratic supranational-
ism, ‘potentially address the problem of how to deal with diversity in the
Community and attempts to find a modus vivendi between the various actors
at all levels’.¹⁸ And yet, despite representing the link between the European
Union and its citizens, problems arise about what ‘organized civil society’
refers to at both levels of policy-making and its boundaries with social dia-
logue. Secondly, the ambiguity of the concept increases the confusion sur-
rounding the already highly complex distribution of competence in the
European Union and augments the dispersion and fragmentation of the
decision-making system. Thirdly, trans-national governance not only poses
a threat to Member States’ sovereignty but, contemporaneously, also repre-
sents a challenge for the Community method.¹⁹ Both the European Union and
the Member States in fact are struggling with asserting their position of
authority and legitimization in the sense that the notion of Staatrecht aptly
summarizes²⁰ and, more broadly, in controlling the destabilizing effects of glob-
alization, which has created new social structures, technologies, and knowl-
edge-based spheres that need to be organized systematically.
Hence, what we are witnessing is a contraposition between two opposing
forces, i.e., a resilient tendency towards adaptability to these new forms of
diversity and flexibility versus the maintenance of a traditional conception of
law, or, to put it more succinctly, regulation versus deregulation.
A Revised Framework for the EES 355
¹⁴ See J. Rosenau, ‘A Transformed Observer in a Transforming World’ (1999) 1/2 Studia
Diplomatica 5–15.
¹⁵ See C. Joeges and E. Vos, ‘Structures of Transnational Governance and Their Legitimacy’ in
J.A. Vervaele (ed.), Compliance and Enforcement of European Community Law (Kluwer Law
International, The Hague, London, Boston, 1999) 79–80. See also C. Lord, ‘Legitimacy, Democracy
and the EU: When Abstract Questions Become Practical Policy Problem’, Policy Paper 03/00, avail-
able online at: www.one-europe.ac.uk. ¹⁶ COM(2001)428, 3.
¹⁷ On the discourse of civil society see K. Armstrong, ‘Rediscovering Civil Society: The
European Union and the White Paper on Governance’ (2002) 8 ELJ 102–32.
¹⁸ See Joeges and Vos, above n. 15, 87; C. Joerges, ‘Deliberative Supranationalism—Two
Defences’ (2002) 8 ELJ 138.
¹⁹ See P. Pierson and S. Leibfried, ‘The Dynamics of Social Policy Integration’ in P. Pierson and
S. Leibfried (eds.), European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration (The
Brookings, Washington, DC, 1995). The authors refer in particular to the area of social policy and
argue that Member States have created structures that they can no longer control completely and
that it is these actors, together with trans-national bodies, that primarily contribute to the devel-
opments in social policy.
²⁰ According to this concept the law is adopted exclusively by the State and is at the same time
at the exclusive service of the State. See O. Mayer, Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht (Duncker &
Humblot, Leipzig, 1895) 64 ff.
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This explains why the Commission’s White Paper on EU Governance appears
to be more concerned with limiting the sphere of action of these new pro-
cesses rather than in fostering it,²¹ and why these new actors are, for the most
part, excluded from the decision-making sphere and are given a more import-
ant role in the implementation side of policy-making. In this sense, these
actors may clearly be seen as being regulatory and legitimacy resources of
the European Union. Scott and Trubek aptly describe this current state of
affairs by introducing a distinction between ‘new/old governance’ (NOG), i.e.,
framework directives, comitology, and civil society, which do not represent
‘fully-fledged alternatives’ to the Community Method and new governance’,
i.e., partnership, social dialogue, and the OMC, which, on the contrary, repres-
ents a departure from the Community Method.²²
The above analysis highlights the Community’s structural incapacity to
regulate these new processes. It also reveals other important aspects of EU
governance, particularly in the field of social policy. The orientation towards
forms of proceduralization of standards and common values²³ and the pre-
ference for management by objectives rather than management by regula-
tion,²⁴ in the light of the opacity and fragility of the institutional framework
in which these new trans-national forms of policy-making operate, reveal 
the existence of a hidden agenda on the part of the Commission, which is 
convergence in disguise. Barnard and Deakin effectively describe the latter 
as a form of ‘reflexive law or harmonization’, i.e., regulatory interventions,
which rely on the induction of ‘second-order effects’ rather than direct 
prescription, and which ‘couple external regulation with self-regulatory
processes’.²⁵
In the next section I will examine the above issues in the context of the
European Employment Strategy/Open Method of Co-ordination, which illus-
trates writ large the issues analysed so far, following which I will consider its
strengths and weaknesses (section IC).
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²¹ COM(2001)428, 21–2, where the Commission outlines the conditions for the application of
co-regulation and the open method of co-ordination.
²² See J. Scott and D.M. Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the
European Union’ (2002) 8 ELJ 2–5; see A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe, Reality and Myth of
Collective Bargaining in the EC Legal Order (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 38–49. The author
refers to first and second generation alternatives respectively to describe differences in EU policy-
making. ²³ See Barnard, above n. 2, 211.
²⁴ See M. Biagi, ‘The Impact of European Employment Strategy on Role of Labour Law and
Industrial Relations’ [2000] International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial
Relations 161.
²⁵ See C. Barnard and S. Deakin, ‘In Search of Coherence: Social Policy, the Single Market and
Fundamental Rights’ [2000] ILJ 341. For literature on the concept of ‘reflexive law’ see G. Teubner,
‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239;
R. Rogowski and T. Wilthagen (eds.), Reflexive Labour Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague,
London, Boston, 1994); S. Deakin, ‘Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive
Federalism versus Reflexive Harmonisation. A Law and Economics Perspective on Centros’ (2000)
2 CYELS 231.
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.      
      -
As a new form of soft law,²⁶ the European Employment Strategy (EES), also
compared to previous non-binding legal instruments, constitutes a challenge
for legal theory.²⁷ The adoption of a common strategy for employment with
the introduction of a new Title in the EC Treaty, Title VIII, was agreed at the
1997 Amsterdam Summit²⁸ and fast-tracked by the ‘Luxembourg Process’.²⁹
The implementation of the EES is an iterative and multi-level process,
which involves several steps and the adoption of various acts and measures:³⁰
—conclusions by the Presidency of the European Council on the employ-
ment situation within the Member States;
—joint annual report (JER) by the Council and the Commission;
—guidelines (EPGs) by the Council which were based on a four-pillar struc-
ture (employability, entrepeneurship, adaptability, and equal opportuni-
ties) that has been eliminated in the new EPGs process, for simplification
purposes (this is discussed in section C);
—National Action Plans (NAPs) by the Member States;
—recommendations by the Council, if the case so requires, to the Member
States;
—incentives measures by the Council designed to encourage co-operation
between Member States and to support their action in the field of
employment through initiatives aimed at developing exchanges of infor-
mation and best practices;
—monitoring the employment situation and policies in the Member States
with the creation of an Employment Committee assigned with the task of
formulating opinions on the labour market performance; assessment
report on the implementation of the EPGs by the Commission (ARI).
The submission of NAPs by Member States in co-operation with the social
partners, in accordance with common objectives and indicators established
in the annual EPGs, and the evaluation made by the European Institutions
through the JER and the ARI are illustrative of the way the ‘re-regulation’ or 
‘re-nationalization process’³¹ operates in practice. Within the Employment
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²⁶ For a definition of soft law in the Community context see K.C. Wellens and G.M. Borchardt,
‘Soft Law in European Community Law’ (1989) 14 EL Rev. 285.
²⁷ See E. Szyszczak, ‘The Evolving European Employment Strategy’ in J. Shaw (ed.), Social Law
and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000), 197–204 and 216–220).
²⁸ See Presidency Conclusions of the Amsterdam European Council, 16 and 17 June 1997. All
European Council Presidency Conclusions are available online at URL: http//ue.eu.int/en/Info/
eurocouncil/index.htm (accessed 8 Oct. 2001).
²⁹ See Presidency Conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on
Employment, Luxembourg, 20 and 21 Nov. 1997, 4–5, paras. 25–35. ³⁰ See Arts. 125–130 EC.
³¹ See S. Sciarra, ‘Global or Re-nationalised? Past and Future of European Labour Law’ in
F. Snyder (ed.), The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration (Hart
Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 270–1; C. Lafoucrière, ‘The European Employment Strategy, The Third
Pillar: Adaptability’, ETUI Working Paper, DWP 2000.01.03, 7.
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Strategy the EU institutions in fact have a supervision and monitoring role,
assessing Member States’ structural, employment, education, and health
policies in accordance with the common objectives established in the EPGs.
Moreover, the Council may make recommendations to certain Member States
on specific employment policies. The EES therefore represents a sea change
with regard to the EU law-making process both at the national and at the
European level.³² It does this in two ways. First, it introduces innovation whilst
maintaining intact the extant institutional design.³³ Secondly, it entails a shift
from ‘social law and legislative initiatives, towards soft law, or rather policies
aimed at employment creation, which for the most part eschew legislation’.³⁴
Furthermore, the use of more flexible non-binding legal instruments and
the creation of a nexus between the different EU policy areas broaden the EES
scope of action, which goes beyond the field of social policy stricto sensu.
Thus, the EES aims at developing a social dimension to the activities of the
European Union.³⁵
At the Lisbon Summit followed by subsequent summits the EES and similar
policy tools have been defined as regulatory instruments to be included in the
‘Open Method of Co-ordination’ (OMC).³⁶
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³² For a detailed account and analysis of the Employment Strategy see among others:
J. Goetschy, ‘The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and Development’ (1999) 5 European
Journal of Industrial Relations 117–37; Szyszczak, above n. 27, 197–220; M. Biagi, ‘The Impact of
European Employment Strategy on Role of Labour Law and Industrial Relations’ [2000]
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 155–73; E. Szyszczak,
‘III. Social Policy’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 175–86; E. Szyszczak, ‘The New Paradigm for Social Policy: A
Virtuous Circle?’ (2001) 38 CML Rev. 1125–70; S. Ball, ‘The European Employment Strategy: The
Will but not the Way?’ (2001) ILJ 353–75; J. Goetschy, ‘The European Employment Strategy from
Amsterdam to Stockholm: Has It Reached Its Cruising Speed Yet?’ in B. Towers and M. Terry (eds.),
Industrial Relations Journal: European Annual Review (Blackwell, London, 2001); D.M. Trubek
and J. Mosher, ‘New Governance, EU Employment Policy, and the European Social Model’ in
Symposium: Responses to the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance, sections 5 & 6,
available at: www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/0100501.html; J. Kenner, EU Employment
Law, From Rome to Amsterdam (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003) chap. 11.
³³ See F. Scharpf, ‘European Governance: Common Concerns vs. The Challenge of Diversity’ in
Symposium: Responses to the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance, above n. 32.
³⁴ See D. Ashiagbor, ‘EMU and the Shift in the European Labour Law Agenda: from “Social
Policy” to “Employment Policy” ’ (2001) 7 ELJ 317.
³⁵ See Presidency Conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on
Employment, Luxembourg, 20 and 21 Nov. 1997, 4–5, paras. 25–35. The major policy areas are tax-
ation, research and innovation, trans-European transport networks, structural funds, and informa-
tion society; Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 Mar. 2000, para.
5 and paras. 8–23; Presidency Conclusions of the Santa Maria Da Feira Summit, 19 and 20 June
2000, paras. 19–39; Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council Meeting, 7, 8, and 9
Dec. 2000, Annex I, 11–22; Presidency Conclusions of the Stockholm Summit, 23 and 24 Mar.
2001, paras. 10–24, 33–52, and Annex I, 14.
³⁶ For detailed analysis of the functioning of the Open Method of Co-ordination see, among
others, J. Mosher, ‘Open Method of Co-ordination: Functional and Political Origins’ (2000)
European Communities Studies Association Review 7 ff.; D. Hodson and I. Maher, ‘The Open
Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination’ (2001)
39 JCMS 719–46; C. de la Porte, ‘Is the Open Method of Co-ordination Appropriate for Organising
Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?’ (2002) 8 ELJ 35–58; C. de la Porte, P. Pochet,
and G. Room, ‘Social Benchmarking, Policy-Making and the Instruments of New Governance’
(2001) 11 Journal of European Social Policy 291–307; C. Radaelli, ‘Policy Transfer in the European
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The OMC has its origins in the ‘hard’ fiscal provisions and ‘soft’ economic
provisions of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).³⁷ With regard to the
former, Articles 102a (now Article 98) to 104c (now Article 104) and 109j EC
together with the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the Protocol on
the Convergence Criteria, and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)³⁸ introduced
basic rules for budgetary soundness and established procedures for the surveil-
lance of national fiscal policies.³⁹ Member States agreed to meet certain conver-
gence criteria in the form of benchmarks, e.g., a sound government budgetary
position with budget deficits that should not exceed 3 per cent of GDP and
a public debt ratio of no more than 60 per cent of GDP.⁴⁰ In the event of non-
compliance with the SGP, the Council could make a recommendation and issue
a formal sanction in a case of infringement of the SGP. In the context of economic
policy co-ordination a multilateral surveillance system was created to guarantee
that national economic policies would not hinder EU economic policy objectives
and, for the members of the EMU, the objectives of monetary policy. In this case,
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) set up a framework for the ‘soft’
co-ordination of economic policies, setting out the main objectives and substi-
tuting the strict requirements of the ‘hard’ monetary policy provisions with peer
pressure.⁴¹ The priority areas in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy are, added
to employment, social protection, social security, and education. A Social
Inclusion Strategy was adopted in December 2000 by the Nice European Council
and a Social Protection Strategy was agreed at the Stockholm European
Council.⁴² Moreover, it was agreed to adopt a fully decentralized approach in line
with the principle of subsidiarity, in which the European Union, the Member
States, the regional and local authorities, as well as social partners and civil soci-
ety, would be actively involved, using variable forms of partnership.⁴³
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Union’ [2000] Governance 25–43; K. Sisson and P. Marginson, ‘Benchmarking and the
“Europeanisation” of Social and Employment Policy’, Briefing Note 3/01, in the framework of
ESRC One Europe or Several?, Apr. 2001; C. de la Porte and P. Pochet (eds.), Building Social Europe
through the Open Method of Co-ordination (P.I.E.-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2002); F. Bertozzi and
G. Bonoli, ‘Europeanisation and the Convergence of National Social and Employment Policies.
What Can the Open Method of Co-ordination Achieve?’, paper prepared for the ‘Europeanisation
of National Political Institutions’ workshop, ECPR, Joint Session, Turin, 22–27 Mar. 2002.
³⁷ See C. de la Porte, ‘Is the Open Method of Co-ordination Appropriate for Organising
Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?’ (2002) 8 ELJ 40–1. See also C. de la Porte
and P. Pochet, ‘Supple Co-ordination at EU Level and Key Actors’ Involvement’ in de la Porte and
Pochet (eds.), above n. 36, 32–4.
³⁸ See Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, Amsterdam
European Council, 16–17 June 1997 [1997] OJ C236/1.
³⁹ See Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary
positions and the surveillance and co-ordination of economic policies, [1997] OJ L209/1; Council
Regulation (EC) 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the excessive deficit procedure [1997]
OJ L209/6.
⁴⁰ See Art. 2 of the Protocol on the Convergence Criteria Referred to in Art. 109 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community. ⁴¹ See Art. 99 EC.
⁴² See Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 Mar. 2000, paras.
24–34; Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council, 7, 8, and 9 Dec. 2000, para. 20;
Presidency Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council, 23 and 24 Mar. 2001.
⁴³ See Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 Mar. 2000, para. 38.
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Following the Lisbon Summit various institutional reforms particularly
relevant to social policy sensu lato were made regarding: the Committee of the
Regions, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC), and the Social Protection
Committee. The Committee of the Regions has been given a more pro-active
role in examining policy through the preparation of exploratory reports in
advance of Commission proposals, in organizing the exchange of best prac-
tice at the local and regional levels and in reviewing the local and regional
impact of certain directives, reporting to the Commission by the end of 2002
on the possibilities for more flexible means of application.⁴⁴ The ESC has been
assigned an important role in developing a new relationship between institu-
tions and civil society. Like the Committee of the Regions, the ECS is to be
more active in developing opinions and exploratory reports in order to help
shape policies at a much earlier stage than at present.⁴⁵ Finally, the Social
Protection Committee’s advisory status has been strengthened in order to
monitor and promote co-operation and the exchange of best practices in the
field of social protection.⁴⁶
The two key institutional players of the OMC are the European Council and
the Commission respectively. The former has a ‘pre-eminent and co-ordinating
role’ to ‘ensure overall coherence and effective monitoring of progress towards
the new strategic goal’.⁴⁷ The latter instead plays an important pro-active and
methodological role, in that it shapes and defines the development and imple-
mentation of the strategy by structuring the behaviour of the various actors
involved, channelling conflicts, and fostering consensus building.⁴⁸
The OMC is an example of negative integration⁴⁹ and provides a pragmatic
rather than a principled answer to the legitimacy crisis of the European
Union.⁵⁰ In fact an established and embedded social policy process has grad-
ually been taking place at the European level,⁵¹ which raises new and special
problems that demand special policy initiatives and new priorities. The EES
has been designed to meet these new problems. The OMC can be described
as constituting an enmeshment of open participation in the implementation
of policies, consensus building, exchange of best practices and information,
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⁴⁴ See Art. 2(42) of the Treaty of Nice, Doc. No. SN 1247/01, which amended Art. 263 EC;
COM(2001)428, 14.
⁴⁵ See Art. 2(39) of the Nice Treaty, Doc. No. SN 1247/01, which has amended Art. 257 EC;
COM(2001)428, 15.
⁴⁶ See Art. 2(11) of the Nice Treaty, Doc. No. SN 1247/01, 34, which has amended Art. 144 EC.
⁴⁷ See ‘Main Conclusions of the Lisbon Summit by the Portuguese Presidency of the EU’
1 available online at: www.portugal.ue-2000.pt/uk/news/execute/news.asp?id1533.
⁴⁸ See J. Goetschy, ‘The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and Development’ (1999) 5
European Journal of Industrial Relations 135.
⁴⁹ See F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP, Oxford, 1999), chap. 2.
⁵⁰ See E. Szyszczak, ‘Social Policy in the Post-Nice Era’ in A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds.),
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (OUP, Oxford, 2002).
⁵¹ See R. Nielsen and E. Szyszczak, The Social Dimension of the EU (Handelshøjskolens Forlag,
Copenhagen, 1997). The authors identify this new phase as a distinctive sixth phase in the
evolution of EU social policy.
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use of benchmarking, and, more broadly, co-operation and co-ordination
within a multi-tiered framework of governance.⁵²
Moreover, the EES/OMC is based on peer pressure. The constraint on
Member States, therefore, is not legal in nature since this new mode of
governance lacks any system of sanctions and enforcement procedures; it
is a moral constraint or, better said, it is political. This is why these alternative
regulatory methods are defined as ‘soft law’ as opposed to ‘hard law’.⁵³
Hence, the rigid traditional procedures have been replaced by the ‘soft
approach’, in which the Luxembourg (employment), Cardiff (economic reform),
and Cologne (macro-economic reform) processes have become increasingly
co-ordinated. A High Level Forum in fact was held in Brussels on 15 June
2000, which brought together the social partners, the Union’s institutions, the
European Central Bank (ECB), and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to
assess the co-ordinated implementation of the Luxembourg, Cardiff, and
Cologne processes.⁵⁴ At the Lisbon Summit it was also agreed to hold an
annual European Council meeting every spring aimed at monitoring the
implementation of the overall strategy agreed in Lisbon. More precisely, these
special meetings are to be devoted to the examination of economic and social
matters on the basis of the synthesis report prepared by the Commission and
relevant reports from the Council. The first meeting was held on 23 and 24
March 2001, in Stockholm.⁵⁵ Furthermore, at the Laeken Summit, the Council
welcomed the decision to create and institutionalize a European Social Affairs
Summit to be held before each Spring European Council Summit.⁵⁶ The first
one was held in Brussels on the eve of the Laeken Summit, where representa-
tives of management and labour, members of the Presidency of the European
Union, of the European Commission, and more generally of the European
Council met in order to discuss issues regarding social and economic policies
in the European Union.⁵⁷
The next section looks at the objectives of the Employment Strategy 
and shows how the latter represents only a partial answer to the difficult
achievement of overcoming the EU democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis. 
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⁵² See J. Scott and D.M. Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the
European Union’ (2002) 8 ELJ 6–8. The authors identify and describe succinctly 6 factors, which
have fostered the increase in the use of ‘new governance’ instruments.
⁵³ See W. Kenneth Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’
(2000) 54 Int. Org. 421–56.
⁵⁴ See Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 Mar. 2000, para. 40;
Presidency Conclusions of the Santa Maria Da Feira Summit, 19 and 20 June 2000, paras. 19–39.
⁵⁵ See Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 Mar. 2000,
Employment, Economic Reform and Social Cohesion, A Strategic Goal for the Next Decade, The New
Challenge, para. 7. See also Presidency Conclusions of the Santa Maria Da Feira Summit, 19 and
20 June 2000, para. 39; Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council Meeting, 7, 8, and 9
Dec. 2000, para. 34.
⁵⁶ See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, Laeken, 14 and 15 Dec. 2001, 7, para. 23.
⁵⁷ See D. Spinant, ‘European Social Summit Ahead of Laeken” and ‘Social Partners to be
Consulted Ahead of Summits’, available at URL: http://euobserver.com/front_print.phtml?
article_id4555.
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It maintains that the malaise of the strategy is a direct consequence of its
inherent contradiction, in that its strengths constitute, at the same time, its
weaknesses.
.    :
  
The EES aims at achieving six major objectives regarding both the European
and the national level of policy-making:⁵⁸
(i) legitimacy of Community action;
(ii) promotion of policy learning;
(iii) efficiency of policy-making at the European and national levels;
(iv) increase of policy co-ordination among all levels of government;
(v) promotion of greater interaction between different policy areas;
(vi) promotion of trans-national forms of governance whilst maintaining
a certain degree of convergence.
The first objective, legitimacy, has always been pursued by the EC institutions
in the difficult achievement of promoting further integration in policy areas,
which have traditionally been considered as pertaining to the national domain.
From this perspective the EES does not represent an entirely new mode of
governance. Rather it may be defined as constituting a tertium genus, in that
it presents elements of continuity with previous methods of policy-making in
the field of social law and contemporaneously representing an innovative and
qualitative break from the past.
The difficult task of promoting further convergence whilst respecting the
diversity of the various labour market and industrial relations systems (objec-
tive (vi) ) was already undertaken with the Agreement on Social Policy annexed
to the Maastricht Treaty (ASP). The aim of the latter was to introduce a multi-
tiered level of policy and decision-making at the Community level, comple-
menting the use of different regulatory tools, such as directives and non-binding
legal instruments, and to co-ordinate these new methods of regulation with
the Member States’ different modes of legislation and/or policies.⁵⁹ The result
was the power assigned to the social partners to negotiate European frame-
work agreements, which could become European law, the formal consulta-
tion of the social partners in the drafting of social policy directives, and finally
the possibility of implementing directives by way of national collective agree-
ments rather than legislation.
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⁵⁸ See D.M. Trubek and J. Mosher, ‘New Governance, EU Employment Policy, and the European
Social Model’ in Symposium: Responses to the European Commission’s White Paper on Govern-
ance, above n. 32, sections 5 and 6. See also J. Goetschy, ‘The European Employment Strategy,
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⁵⁹ In most Member States, such as France, Spain, Germany, and Italy, social issues were also or
mostly dealt through non-legislative regulatory tools such as collective agreements.
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The Treaty of Amsterdam added further impetus to differentiation and
subsidiarity with the adoption of a common strategy for employment and
with a European collective bargaining system formalized in Title XI.⁶⁰
These reforms were expected to increase the legitimacy of Community
action in the social policy area by adding further importance to the interests
of civil society and, secondly, by increasing the participation of Member States
in the modernization of the European Social Model.⁶¹ Within the EES the
objective is to integrate Member States’ policies with the EPGs in a medium-
and long-term perspective, with results which are to increase at the end of
every cycle and which transcend short-term policies and can therefore more
effectively solve the unemployment problem across Europe.⁶² Goetschy
posits that ‘the EES is a way to “depoliticize” the unemployment problem from
its immediate national contingencies and to address it in a longer-term per-
spective’.⁶³ The very existence of the EES, with its EPGs and its NAPs, shows
that efforts are being made to integrate the various levels of governance both
at the European and national levels, strengthening the co-ordination of
national and European social policies and ultimately increasing the efficiency
of social regulation (objectives (iii) and (iv) ).
The EES in fact has several cardinal features:
(a) most of the policies must be carried out at the national or local level.
There is relatively little direct action by the EC institutions and bodies,
the only exception being the (modest) use of the European structural
funds to support the implementation of the EES;
(b) the primary role of the EU institutions is to provide a general frame-
work for the strategy, to develop specific guidelines, establish a moni-
toring system, and finally to make annual recommendations to the
Member States, where necessary;
(c) the institutional and legislative reforms are established and imple-
mented at the national or local level.
The EES has also brought a change in the objectives of the EU agenda.
Previous EU social policy and legislation were in fact oriented to labour-
market policies linked to the completion of the internal market and to the
creation of EMU, without taking into account core issues of national social
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⁶⁰ Arts. 136–140 EC. See G. Arrigo, Il Diritto del Lavoro dell’Unione Europea, Tomo I, Principi-
Fonti-Libera Circolazione e Sicurezza Sociale dei Lavoratori (Giuffrè Editore, Milan, 1998) 175–88.
The author elaborates on the concept of ‘double subsidiarity’ in referring to the provisions of
Title XI in order to emphasize the coexistence of vertical subsidiarity, i.e., the institutional
dialogue between the Community and the Member States and horizontal subsidiarity, i.e., the
European Social Dialogue in which management and labour co-operate with one another in
stipulating collective agreements, which may then be transposed into EU law.
⁶¹ See Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council, 7, 8, and 9 Dec. 2001, Annex I,
para. 11, for a definition of European Social Model, and Communication from the Commission to
the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee
of the Regions, ‘Social Policy Agenda’, COM(2000)379 final, for the meaning of modernization of
the European Social Model. ⁶² Goetschy, above n. 58.
⁶³ See J. Goetschy, ‘The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and Development’ (1999) 5
European Journal of Industrial Relations 132.
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policies. On the contrary, the EES aims at addressing issues which directly
affect national employment policies and industrial relations systems. This is
explained by the fact that ‘the more nationally sensitive a subject and the
more difficult to resolve at national level, the more likely are Member States to
become involved in an EU co-ordination procedure’.⁶⁴ Syrpis maintains that
‘in performance legitimacy terms, the focus has shifted away from the com-
pletion of the internal market, towards the re-distributive implications of
European integration’.⁶⁵ Another feature of the EES is that it integrates separ-
ate policy domains⁶⁶ (objective (v) ). This can be seen in the selection of the
areas on which the EPGs are adopted.⁶⁷ Both the EPGs and the NAPs illustrate
that the EES has already identified a series of areas where the independent
operation of the various actors involved and policy boundaries are to be sub-
stituted by strict co-operation, co-ordination, and with the implementation of
horizontal, preventive, and active measures and initiatives at all levels.
Moreover, even in areas that are covered by the EPGs the EES does not
always demand convergence: many of the guidelines leave the States with
a substantial level of discretion with regard to the ways of adopting the meas-
ures concerned. It may be argued therefore that the EES does aim at achiev-
ing convergence, but it is mostly convergence of results rather than policies.
In this regard, the EES presents the same intrinsic logic of a directive. In fact,
although directives are part of EC secondary ‘hard’ law they are binding
only ‘as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is
addressed, leaving to the national authorities the choice of form and meth-
ods’.⁶⁸ The difference between the two regulatory methods lies in the fact that
whereas the EES is a deliberative form of governance, directives are, on the
contrary, based on a diplomatic operational mode.⁶⁹ Secondly, as a soft law
instrument, the EES does not provide any kind of legal sanction in the event
of a Member State failing to meet the EPGs’ objectives. This can be partially
explained by the fact that in most cases the EPGs do not provide quantified
targets. It would thus be hard to establish whether a Member State, given its
economic and social structure, has achieved the objectives established by the
EPGs. Even in cases where the target to be achieved has to correspond to the
average of the three best performing Member States,⁷⁰ it would be considered
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⁶⁴ See J. Goetschy, ‘The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and Development’ (1999) 5
European Journal of Industrial Relations 133.
⁶⁵ See P. Syrpis, ‘Legitimising European Governance: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously within the
Open Method of Co-ordination’, EUI Working Paper, Law 2002/10.
⁶⁶ See S. Ball, ‘The European Employment Strategy: The Will but not the Way?’ (2001) 30 ILJ
359–66; P. Syrpis, ‘Smoke Without Fire: The Social Policy Agenda and the Internal Market’ (2001)
30 ILJ 271–88. Both authors analyse effectively the tensions between the Employment Strategy
and other EU policies.
⁶⁷ Previously, measures aimed at fostering entrepreneurship, at promoting vocational 
(re-)training of workers, and at strengthening gender mainstreaming were not only dealt with by
different authorities, institutions, and bodies but were also regulated separately.
⁶⁸ See Art. 249(3) EC.
⁶⁹ Contra, Goetschy, above n. 63. The author argues in fact that in the case of directives the
diplomatic mode of interaction prevails, and there is a lack of deliberative process, which on the
contrary typifies the EES. ⁷⁰ This is the case, e.g., of G 2, regarding the Employability Pillar.
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to be politically incorrect for the Commission and the Council to impose legal
sanctions on those Member States which fail to achieve quantified targets,
since the industrial relations systems and the labour markets of the countries
are extremely varied. This explains why the use of recommendations and
the adoption of incentive measures by the Council, designed to encourage 
co-operation between Member States and to support their action in the field
of employment through initiatives aimed at developing exchanges of informa-
tion and best practices, appear far more successful in promoting structural
reforms in the Member States.
Another objective of the EES is the promotion of policy learning. Teague
argues that alternative regulatory and deliberative methods, which promote
policy learning and innovation, are preferable to the more traditional modes
of governance.⁷¹ Some scholars argue that this is an area where the EES has
been most successful.⁷²
The amendments introduced in the EPGs, in particular in the guidelines for
2001,⁷³ are evidence of the fact that overall the EES is fostering policy learning
and innovation. While some are an attempt to refine the previous EPGs, the
most recent guidelines introduce new objectives and targets.⁷⁴ Some of the
changes inserted in the EPGs exemplify the fact that the learning process is
gradually affecting policy development, and the preliminary results achieved
so far suggest that more changes will be made also at the national level in the
years to come.⁷⁵
The Dolowitz and Marsh model develops a framework for analysing the
process of policy transfer.⁷⁶ The model conceives policy transfer as a dependent
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⁷¹ See P. Teague, ‘Deliberative Governance and EU Social Policy’ (2001) 7 European Journal of
Industrial Relations 7; M. Easterby Smith, M. Crossan, and D. Nicolini, ‘Organisational Learning:
Debates Past, Present and Future’ (2000) 98 CLR 267–473.
⁷² See M. Ferrera, A. Hemerijk, and M. Rhodes, The Future of Social Europe: Recasting Work and
Welfare in the New Economy (OUP, Oxford, 2001); Trubek and Mosher, above n. 32.
⁷³ 5 so-called ‘horizontal objectives’ have been introduced. For a detailed analysis see
C. Degryse and P. Pochet, Social Developments in the European Union, Second Annual Report
(OSE and ETUI, Brussels, 2001) 16–19 (online), available at: www.ose.be/en/default.htm.
⁷⁴ Examples of these changes are the addition of an obligation to modernize Member States’
public employment services and apprenticeship systems with an effort to change the measures
from passive to more preventive and active ones. Other changes concern the new obligations 
to eliminate the levels of poverty by reforming tax and social benefit systems; improving skill
qualifications, providing training for future entrepreneurs, introducing policies to keep older
workers in the workforce, and finally adopting new labour-market policies to create a European
knowledge-based society. See Council Decision on guidelines for Member States’ employment
policies for the year 2001 of 19 Jan. 2001 [2001] OJ L22/18, G 1 and 10 (public services) and G 4,
G 9, G 3, G 5.
⁷⁵ See Commission Staff Working Paper, Assessment of the Implementation of the 2001
Employment Guidelines, Supporting Document to the Joint Employment Report 2001, SEC(2001)
1398; see also European Commission, Employment in Europe 2001, Recent Trends and Prospects,
(online), available at: //europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/empl&esf/docs/empleurope
2001_en.pdf.
⁷⁶ See D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, ‘Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in
Contemporary Policy-Making’ (2000) 13 Governance 5. The model is built around 6 questions:
(1) Why do actors engage in policy transfer?; (2) Who are the key actors involved in the policy
transfer process?; (3) What is transferred?; (4) From where are lessons drawn?; (5) What are the
different degrees of transfer?; (6) What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process?
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variable and looks either at the main elements of policy transfer or at the
reasons for learning. The model shows that policy transfer may also be treated
as an explanatory variable, but it cannot alone be the only variable explaining
policy development. This is because there is not enough evidence to confirm
that policy transfer has been successful in promoting policy diffusion.
The implementation of the EES exemplifies the way the ‘re-nationalization
process’⁷⁷ operates in practice, which, therefore, entails, on the one hand, the
Europeanization of social policy and, on the other hand, increases the import-
ance of national social pacts.⁷⁸ The EES in fact promotes the creation of new
employment and labour-market paradigms through the exchange of best
practices and benchmarking and by linking various areas of social policy
together, from both a supply- and demand-side perspective.⁷⁹
Recent case studies, which assessed the implementation of the EES at the
national level, however, reveal a less optimistic picture of the EES. The case
studies conducted have been confronted first of all with research method-
ological problems. Reliable data sources are scarce and not uniform, and the
availability of information varies between countries. In particular, informa-
tion on Southern Mediterranean countries has been insufficiently detailed,
and the NAPs are a mere reformulation of national programmes. Added to
this, the difficulty also consisted in assessing the data available, i.e., cross-
country comparisons have been hard to make owing to the different national
labour market patterns.
As regards the causal link between the EES and the national employment
and labour-market policies the case studies have shown that the EPGs and
national social policies either aimed at achieving similar objectives or, on the
contrary, had different targets. In the former case, empirical studies had to
assess whether there was any influence of the Strategy on the adoption of
national policy objectives and, secondly, if any influence was found to have
taken place, the extent of reciprocal influence of both levels of governance,
i.e., whether the input was supranational or national, and, more precisely,
establish whether it was the supranational or the intergovernmental element
to prevail in the Strategy. In the event of different policy objectives, the
research aimed at analysing national labour markets in order to explain why
there was a divergence of policy objectives. The second step was to assess the
effective implementation of the Strategy at the national level. In the case of
non-convergence of policy objectives the research studies were conducted in
order to provide some valuable proposals for reform in line with the EPGs. The
countries selected for the case studies were France, Sweden, Denmark, and
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Spain, each representing different labour markets’ performances and political
practices.⁸⁰
The case studies showed that the level of ‘policy distance’ between a given
national context and the European objectives determines the level of
European influence on the national level.⁸¹ The studies also revealed an inter-
esting scenario. In the first place, even where the implementation of the EPGs
appears to be mostly influential, i.e., in Sweden and Denmark, research
revealed that the NAPs process had little direct relation with decisions made
within the domestic labour-market policy process, and the apparent success
of the EES was mainly due to similar objectives. Moreover, the whole process
was mostly administered at the ministerial level, i.e., Ministry of Economy
and Finance and Social Affairs.⁸² In fact even though the participation of
social partners in these two countries is higher compared with that of other
countries, the case studies revealed that their involvement is still more for-
malistic and passive—‘more a matter of information than real consultation or
negotiation with the government’—than at the domestic level of policy-
making.⁸³ In France research showed that the NAPs process is still in the phase
of formal adaptation and there is no ‘real’ reformulation of national policy
objectives. Particularly relevant in this case is the fact that at the European level
France retains a high degree of manœuvre and has directly influenced the
drafting of the EPGs. Under the French Presidency of the European Union, in
fact, the government representatives have been continuously pushing for
introducing more emphasis on the concept of quality of work. As a result new
horizontal objectives were introduced in the 2001 EPGs, which also included
quality of work.⁸⁴ The studies conducted thus confirm that the intergovern-
mental element in the Strategy is very strong. In Spain the Luxembourg process
has promoted a re-thinking of policy-making by fostering the co-ordination
between different administrations and the rationalization of employment and
labour-market policies, one important aspect being the increase in expenditure
for employment-related policies. However, case studies showed that the EES is
insufficient per se due to particular political patterns and to the existence of
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⁸⁰ For Sweden and Denmark see K. Jacobsson and H. Schmid, ‘Real Integration or just Formal
Adaptation?—On the Implementation of the National Action Plans for Employment’ in de la Porte
and Pochet, above n. 36, 69–95; M. Junestav, ‘Labour Cost Reduction, Taxes and Employment:
The Swedish Case’ in de la Porte and Pochet (eds.), above n. 36, 137–75; for France, see G. Coron
and B. Palier, ‘Changes in the Means of Financing Social Expenditure in France since 1945’ in
de la Porte and Pochet (eds.), above n. 36, 97–136; for Spain, see J. Gonzaléz-Calvet, ‘Employment
Policies in Spain: From Flexibilisation to the European Employment Strategy’ in de la Porte and
Pochet (eds.), above n. 36, 177–221.
⁸¹ See K. Anderson, ‘The Europeanisation of Pension Arrangements: Convergence or
Divergence?’ in de la Porte and Pochet (eds.), above n. 36, 256.
⁸² See Jacobsson and Schmid, above n. 80, n. 70. The authors argue that EES is ‘a rather insular
process of interaction’ between administrative top-level professionals and civil servants in the
Directorate General of Employment and Social Affairs and national ministries’.
⁸³ Ibid., 86–7.
⁸⁴ See Council Decision of 19 Jan. 2001 on Guidelines for Member States’ employment policies
for the year 2001 (2001/63/EC).
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persisting structural problems. With regard to the involvement of the social
partners in the adoption and implementation of the NAPs, most social part-
ners have reported positively on the Luxembourg Process. Whereas participa-
tion in the shaping of the NAPs was considered insufficient in the early years
of the Strategy, recent evidence shows that there is greater participation,
although the degree of the social partners’ contribution varies according to
the area taken into consideration.⁸⁵
However, the role of the social partners is still unsatisfactory, still being far
from proper negotiation and consultation with the government. This situa-
tion contrasts with the EPGs particularly with regard to areas covered by the
old ‘Adaptability’ pillar, where the social partners are given a key role in the
modernization of work organization and in lifelong learning measures.⁸⁶
Moreover, the NAPs reveal that it is mostly national confederations that are
involved in the process, and little information is provided on the extent of
the social partners’ participation at the sectoral level.⁸⁷ In addition, several
national union confederations report having less than two weeks to provide
input into plans or reports and that no real effort has been made for their par-
ticipation in the process.⁸⁸ Finally, there is scant information on the interac-
tion between national and European social partners in the development of
the Strategy. The ETUC⁸⁹ is said to have been insufficiently involved.⁹⁰
Lafoucrière argues that the effective implementation of policies under the
then ‘Adaptability’ pillar could be guaranteed only by the wider use of ‘positive
social dialogue’, i.e., by introducing more specific guidelines, which are cur-
rently too vague, and by defining more clearly an active role for the social
partners in the EES.⁹¹
One final point concerns the obligation that Member States have to
exchange best practices. With the beginning of the second annual cycle of the
NAPs, Member States have been required to present examples of best prac-
tices. The achievement of this target has not been fully successful. Although
the JER lists a few examples of best practices, the method used for the sharing
of best practices consists in the review of the NAPs of those Member States
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⁸⁵ See Commission Staff Working Paper, above n. 85; see also European Commission, above n. 75.
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which have not given enough details of best practices, which are then circu-
lated to all Member States. Moreover, the NAPs dedicate a section to best prac-
tices only in the appendix, which is usually only two to three pages long. The
Commission has therefore started a series of meetings with representatives of
the national governments to identify best practices and promote their
exchange between all the Member States. Hence, NAPs have not only to be
submitted to the Commission but also made available to the representatives
of all the Member States for comparison and evaluation. While this does cer-
tainly promote peer review, the whole session allocated to each National Plan
is only of one hour. The session includes a brief presentation by the Member
State, comments by two other Member States, and discussion. Thus it is nec-
essary to review these learning policy mechanisms in order to make them
more effective.
The EES therefore has various weaknesses that are inherent in its soft-law
nature. For the purpose of this chapter I will highlight those which, from the
viewpoint of EU governance, hinder its potential ability to be an alternative
mode of governance. First, the very nature of the Employment Strategy as
a non-binding legal instrument does not allow for accurate assessment of the
results achieved, given that national measures may not be based on the EPGs
to be adopted and that many elements of the EES are already part of national
policy programmes. Secondly, the subordination of EES implementation to
the economic and political situations within the various Member States, com-
bined with its soft-law nature, does not guarantee its further development in
moments of economic recession or political instability. Moreover, the paucity
of specific procedural rules and detailed guidelines, the scant information on
the operationalization of the exercise of benchmarking—particularly on how
parameters and structural indicators are selected and applied the absence of
a clear definition of the distribution of competence,⁹² particularly at the
national level, and, finally, the lack of a system of legal or formal sanctions in
the event of non-alignment of a given Member State with the EPGs seriously
undermine the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Strategy as a form of
deliberative supra-nationalism⁹³ considering that the guidelines are normat-
ive in character.⁹⁴ The whole process seems in fact to be taking place between
‘elites for elites’.⁹⁵ Moreover, both the EU Parliament and the Committee of the
Regions have been given a minor consultative role in the overall implementa-
tion⁹⁶ and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is absent from the process.
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The above ‘underlines the opacity and complexity of the institutional
framework’.⁹⁷ The EES/OMC therefore ‘may lead to the formal reassignment
of policy powers from the national to the EU level and hence may not provide
durable alternative to the traditional EU model’.⁹⁸
II. Bridging the Gap between Titles VIII and XI: A Normative
Reconstruction of the European Employment Strategy
. :     ,
   
The adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,⁹⁹ the Laeken
Declaration,¹⁰⁰ coupled with the setting up of a Convention charged with con-
sidering the future of the European Union,¹⁰¹ and the 2004 IGC¹⁰² have fos-
tered the debate about a European Constitution and a catalogue of rights to
be included in the EC Treaty.¹⁰³
These events illustrate how constitutional issues have become strictly
intertwined with the discourse of rights and citizenship.¹⁰⁴ More importantly,
they emphasize how the European Union has decisively gone beyond its
exclusive nature of an economic union, the Community top priority being the
transformation of the European Union into a renovated and strengthened
quasi-state polity. The European Union is in fact searching for new ideas on
how to ‘re-dress’ its own political identity and image. Consequently, particular
emphasis is given to a ‘EU citizenship practice’ ‘understood as the action that
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⁹⁷ See Hodson and Maher, above n. 93, 730–2. ⁹⁸ Ibid.
⁹⁹ The Charter was issued by joint act of the European Parliament, the Council of the European
Union, and the European Commission on 7 Dec. 2000 (see [2000] OJ C364/1) and came into force
on 26 Feb. 2001. The Charter lists 50 specific rights apart from the general provisions contained
in Arts. 51–54. These rights are subdivided into 6 chaps.: Chap. I ‘Dignity’, Arts. 1–5; Chap. II
‘Freedoms’, Arts. 6–19; Chap. III ‘Equality’, Arts. 20–26; Chap. IV ‘Solidarity’, Arts. 27–38; Chap. V
‘Citizens’ Rights’, Arts. 39–46; and Chap. VI ‘Justice’, Arts. 47–50. For further documentation on the
Charter visit the EU website at URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charter/
index_en.html; see also the European Parliament special website at: www.europarl.eu.int/
charter/default_en.htm.
¹⁰⁰ See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, Laeken, 14 and 15 Dec. 2001, 
Annex I, 1–9.
¹⁰¹ For information and analysis of the workings of the Convention on the Future of the
European Union and, more broadly, to follow the constitutional debate on the EU see the website
of the Federal Trust for Education and Research at: www.fedtrust.co.uk/eu_constitution.
¹⁰² Ibid., 8.
¹⁰³ There is a vast amount of literature on both issues. For an analytical study of the EU Charter
see Report of the Comité des Sages, For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights (European
Commission, Brussels, 1996); Report of the Expert Group on Fundamental Rights, Affirming
Fundamental Rights in the European Union, Time to Act (European Commission, D-G for
Employment & Social Affairs, Brussels, 1999). For a detailed account of constitutionalism issues
see P. Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2001) 7 ELJ 125–50.
¹⁰⁴ See European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Report on ‘The Constitu-
tionalisation of the Treaties’, Session Document, 12 Oct. 2000, Final, A5–0289/2000; see also
Commission Communication, ‘A Basic Treaty for the European Union’, COM(2000)434 final.
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contributes to the establishment of citizenship rights, access and belonging in
a community’.¹⁰⁵ In this respect, the modernization of the European Social
Model¹⁰⁶ has fuelled the debate about a European droit social paving the way
towards the development of the concept of ‘citizen-worker’ as opposed to
‘market citizen’,¹⁰⁷ who is granted a specific set of civil and social as well as
economic rights.¹⁰⁸ The conceptualization of EU citizenship is far from an
easy enterprise. EU citizenship¹⁰⁹ represents an institutional challenge with
an evolving dimension. Its development in fact cannot be separated from the
broader process of Europeanization.¹¹⁰ The main difficulty consists in the fact
that citizenship is a premise for statehood,¹¹¹ and because the European
Union is a non-state polity, the sources for a definition of EU citizenship nec-
essarily lay somewhere between citizenship and nationality. The trait d’union
is the protection of fundamental rights¹¹² and, more broadly, the catalogue of
human rights embedded in the constitutional traditions of the Member States
and further developed in the European Union,¹¹³ which has been transformed
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¹⁰⁵ See A. Wiener, ‘The Developing Practice of “European Citizenship” ’ in M. La Torre (ed.),
European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London,
Boston, 1998), 392. See also Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council of 3 and 4
June 1999, Annex IV, para. 1: ‘To establish a Charter of fundamental rights in order to make their
overriding importance and relevance more visible to the Union’s citizens. . . . The European
Council believes that this Charter should contain fundamental rights and freedoms as well as
basic procedural rights. In drawing such a Charter account should furtnermore be taken of eco-
nomic and social rights as contained in the European Social Charter and the Community Charter
of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (Article 136 TEC), insofar as they do not merely estab-
lish objectives for action by the Union’ (emphasis added).
¹⁰⁶ See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Social Policy Agenda’,
COM(2000)379 final.
¹⁰⁷ See A. Marias Epaminondas, ‘From Market Citizen to Union Citizen’ in A. Marias Epaminondas
(ed.), European Citizenship (European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 1994), 1–24.
¹⁰⁸ Civil and political rights have, both in theory and in practice, received full recognition,
whereas economic and social rights are still the subject matter of very heated debates. See A. Eide,
C. Krause, and A. Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff,
Dordrecht, 1995) 15; M. Scheinin, ‘Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights’ in ibid., 41–62.
¹⁰⁹ See Arts. 17–22 EC.
¹¹⁰ See Szyszczak, above n. 32, 1161–2. Szyszczak shows how the new social policy paradigm
has recently informed the human rights and citizenship discourse within the EU legislative prac-
tice. Two directives are illustrative: Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general frame-
work for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16; and Directive
2000/43 on race discrimination [2000] OJ L180/22.
¹¹¹ See J. Weiler, ‘The State über alles. Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’, Jean
Monnet Working Paper, No. 6/95, available online at: www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/
papers95.html.
¹¹² See D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso, ‘Fundamental Rights and the European Citizen’ in La Torre
(ed.), above n. 105, 255.
¹¹³ See Case 186/87 Ian William Cowan v. Trésor Public [1989] ECR 216; Case C–85/96 María
Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I–2709. These two cases illustrate the nexus between
EU citizenship and fundamental rights. In these two decisions the Court linked Art. 12 EC, dis-
crimination on grounds of nationality, to the freedom of movement principle in order to protect
and broaden the scope of national social rights vis-à-vis EU citizenship. See also Case C–184/99,
Grzelczyk [2001] Rec. I–6193, (online) available at: www.cria.eu.int/common/recdoc/indexaz/en/
c2.htm.
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from an international Treaty to a constitutional legal order.¹¹⁴ Within the
process of European integration EU citizenship promotes not only the eco-
nomic role but also the constitutional role of the individual.¹¹⁵ The latter in
fact is situated in a polity characterized by a weak political core, multi-level
networks, and changed capital/labour relations,¹¹⁶ which is now aiming to
achieve a clear identity and legitimacy of its own deriving from below.
The ECJ has played a pivotal role in marking the gradual shift towards
a social dimension of rights¹¹⁷ in its process of constitutionalization of the
Treaty, including the protection of fundamental rights, notably in the area of the
free movement of persons and equal treatment between men and women.¹¹⁸
The Stauder ruling in fact made it clear that fundamental rights are part of the
general principles of Community law and protected by the Court.¹¹⁹ In addi-
tion, the development of general principles of EU law such as proportionality,
horizontal direct effect, equality, and non-discrimination have had an impor-
tant role in substantiating the Treaty provisions in social policy.¹²⁰
The Court has had a major role, not only in fostering social rights¹²¹ through
the enforcement of EC law, but also in the actual creation of European social
rights,¹²² although the rationale of its case law has not always been coherent.
Acting on the basis of what has been defined as ‘purposeful opportunism’,¹²³
the Court has in fact used the ‘language of rights’ with caution and in a piece-
meal way.¹²⁴ Its case law has greatly contributed to the drafting of the EU
Charter. The Court in fact has also interpreted directly non-social European
acts in order to guarantee the social protection of EU nationals. In the deci-
sions made in the Walrave and Koch,¹²⁵ Bosman,¹²⁶ and, more recently,
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¹¹⁴ See Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1,
11–13; G.F. Mancini, ‘The Making of a Constitution for Europe’ (1989) 26 CMLRev. 595.
¹¹⁵ See O’Keeffe and Bavasso, above n. 112, 262.
¹¹⁶ See J. Caporaso, ‘The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-
Modern?’ (1996) 34 JCMS 45–8.
¹¹⁷ See Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne (SABENA) [1976]
ECR 455, [1976] 2 CMLR 98, para. 10, where the Court stated that the Community is not only an
economic union but is also intended to ensure social progress and seek to improve the living and
working conditions of European citizens.
¹¹⁸ See B. De Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection
of Human Rights’ in P. Alston, M. Bustelo, and J. Heenan (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (OUP,
Oxford, 1999), 859–97. See also P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials
(3rd edn., OUP, Oxford, 2003) chaps. 7, 16, 19.
¹¹⁹ See Case 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419, 425. ¹²⁰ Ibid.
¹²¹ See Szyszczak, above n. 32, 1164–7 for an analysis of the impact of the new social policy
paradigm on the Court’s case law.
¹²² See K. Lenaerts and P. Foubert, ‘Social Rights in the Case-Law of the European Court of
Justice, The Impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on Standing
Case-Law’ (2001) 28 LIEI 267–96.
¹²³ See D. Wincott, ‘The Role of Law or the Rule of the Court of Justice? An Institutional Account
of Judicial Politics in the European Community’ (1995) 2 JEPP 583.
¹²⁴ See G. de Búrca, ‘The Language of Rights and European Integration’ in J. Shaw and G. More
(eds.), New Legal Dynamics of the European Union (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) 39–43.
¹²⁵ See Case 36/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Kock v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale,
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405.
¹²⁶ See Case C–415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL and others
v. Jean Marc Bosman and others [1995] ECR I–4921.
EECK-CH09.qxd  2/19/04  2:59 PM  Page 372
Angonese¹²⁷ and Ferlini ¹²⁸ cases the Court has contributed to the fight against
discrimination perpetrated against EU employees, and in doing so it was indi-
rectly influenced by the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to
engage in work, which are now also protected by Article 15 of the EU Charter.
The influence of the Court’s case law can also be seen with regard to Article 34
of the EU Charter in the Decker¹²⁹ and Kohll¹³⁰ judgments, where the Court
highlighted the importance of the fundamental principle of freedom of move-
ment, but also aimed to safeguard social security systems when stating that
the financial balance of social security systems may constitute an ‘overriding
reason capable of justifying a barrier of that kind’.¹³¹
Lenaerts and Foubert argue that the ‘EU Charter constitutes a neutral con-
firmation of the rights’¹³² it intends to safeguard because its scope is limited
a priori by Article 52(2) of the Charter.¹³³ I do not entirely agree with this state-
ment. I will explain this by analysing the EU Charter and the OMC together.
Both the Charter and the OMC have been conceived as ‘dynamic soft law
instruments’,¹³⁴ which promote the Europeanization process ‘by building
upon and around the aquis’¹³⁵ without directly affecting the extant institu-
tional design. Moreover, similarities may be drawn between the provisions of
Articles 51¹³⁶ and 52(2) of the Charter and the White Paper on ‘EU Governance’,
in the part where it says that the OMC does not supplant but supplement the
Community Method.¹³⁷ However, whilst the wording of the White Paper is
explicit, i.e., the OMC ‘should be a complement rather than a replacement for
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¹²⁷ See Case C–281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR
I–4139.
¹²⁸ See Case C–411/98 Angelo Ferlini v. Centre Hospitalier de Luxembourg [2000] ECR I–8081.
¹²⁹ See Case C–120/95 Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés [1998] ECR
I–1871.
¹³⁰ See Case C–158/96 Raymond Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] ECR I–1935.
¹³¹ See Case C–120/95, above n. 129, para. 39; Case C–158/96, above n. 130, para. 41.
¹³² Ibid., 293–6. The authors develop their thesis by analysing and comparing the provision
contained in Art. 21(1) of the Charter and Art. 13 EC, both regarding the prohibition of discrimi-
nation (except discrimination based on nationality, the prohibition of which is sanctioned in
Arts. 12 EC and 21(2) of the Charter) and by looking at the Grant judgment: Case C–249/96 Lisa
Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd. [1998] ECR I–636. The authors argue that even though
the provision of Art. 21(1) of the Charter has a broader scope its effective implementation is
hindered by the provision contained in Art. 52(2) of the Charter. They conclude by stating that
Ms Grant would probably not have benefited so easily from the EU Charter were it in force at the
time of the judgment.
¹³³ Art. 52(2) of the Charter provides that ‘rights recognised by this Charter, which are based on
the Community Treaties or the Treaty on European Union shall be exercised under the conditions
and within the limits defined by those Treaties’.
¹³⁴ See J. Kenner, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union—A Panacea
for European Social Law?’, ECSA Seventh Biennial International Conference, Madison, Wisc.,
31 May–2 June 2001, 11; and for a deeper analysis of the Charter as a non-binding legal instru-
ments see also 12–15. ¹³⁵ Ibid., 12–13 (emphasis added).
¹³⁶ Art. 51 of the Charter provides that: ‘The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the
institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to
the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the
rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their
respective powers. This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or
the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties’ (emphasis added).
¹³⁷ COM(2001)428, 21.
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Community action’,¹³⁸ the same cannot be said about the horizontal provisions
of the Charter. In fact, whereas the combined reading of Articles 51 and 52(2)
of the Charter seems to suggest a limitation of the scope of the Charter with
regard to the creation of new powers within the Community or the Union and
the extent of the exercise of the rights recognized in the Charter, the provision
of paragraph 3 of Article 52 of the Charter allows for a different interpretation
altogether. The fact that EU law may provide more extensive protection of the
rights contained in the Charter than the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) may be interpreted as meaning
that the European institutions may in the future agree to establish new pow-
ers or tasks for the Community or the Union with regard to the protection of
the rights sanctioned in the Charter. This contention is further strengthened
by the fact that in the draft Constitutional Treaty the Charter has been inserted
as Part II of the Treaty, and has therefore become legally binding.¹³⁹ It is to be
hoped that this will be the case since not only individual and group standing
to challenge Community measures directly before the Court through the
means of Article 230 EC is, and has been, extremely restrictive but the ability
of the individual to challenge an EU measure for a breach of the ECHR
depends on whether the measure has already been implemented at the
national level.¹⁴⁰
Previously, I showed how the Court’s case law has influenced the drafting of
the Charter. At the same time, however, the EU Charter also represents a valu-
able interpretative tool for the Court, which will continue to have an import-
ant constitutionalization role in the area of fundamental rights.¹⁴¹ The Court
of First Instance has already referred to Articles 41 and 47 of the EU Charter¹⁴²
in various cases.¹⁴³ Hence, there is a dialectical relationship and mutual influ-
ence between the EU Charter and the case law of the Court. In fact, with
regard to social policy sensu lato the inclusion of the freedom of assembly and
association, the right to information and consultation, and the right to collect-
ive bargaining and action in the EU Charter¹⁴⁴ is particularly relevant to
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¹³⁸ COM(2001)428, 21.
¹³⁹ See European Convention, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV
820/1/03, REV 1, Brussels, 27 June 2003 (01.07), Part II. ¹⁴⁰ See Art. 51 of the EU Charter.
¹⁴¹ The importance of the EU Charter in the case law of the Court is highlighted by the Opinion
of Tizzano AG in the BECTU case, where in addressing the Charter’s status the AG said that: ‘it
includes statements, which appear in large measure to reaffirm rights, which are enshrined in
other [international] instruments. I think therefore that, in proceedings concerned with the
nature and scope of a fundamental right, the relevant statements of the Charter cannot be
ignored; in particular, we cannot ignore its clear purpose of serving, where its provisions so allow,
as a substantive point of reference for all those involved, Member States, institutions, natural and
legal persons, in the Community context’. See Opinion of Tizzano AG delivered on 8 Feb. 2001 in
Case C–173/99 Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) v.
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] ECR I–4881 paras. 27–28; see also paras. 22–28.
¹⁴² Right to a good administration and right to an effective legal remedy respectively.
¹⁴³ See Case T–54/99 Max.mobil v. Commission, judgment of 30 Jan. 2002, paras. 48 and
57 (Arts. 41 and 47 of the Charter); Case T–198/01R Technishce Glaswerke, order of 4 Apr. 2002,
para. 85 (Art. 41 of the Charter), and Case T–177/01 Jégo-Quéré et Cie v. Commission, judgment of
3 May 2002, para. 47 (Art. 47 of the Charter). ¹⁴⁴ See Arts. 12(1), 27, and 28 of the Charter.
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the discourse of EU Governance, and it broadens the logic of the acquis
communautaire in the area of social policy. Their inclusion may in fact help to
overcome the inadequacy of the legislative competence in relation to transna-
tional matters at the EU level. In this respect, Sciarra had already argued
before the adoption of the EU Charter that the insertion of the right to organ-
ize in the EU fundamental social rights would strengthen the position, repre-
sentativity, and standing of supranational associations.¹⁴⁵
The drafting of these provisions has been particularly difficult as they
reflect the diversity of Member States’ labour markets and industrial relations
system and the limited scope of EU competence.¹⁴⁶ What follows is a brief
analysis of the three provisions regarding the freedom of assembly and asso-
ciation, the right to information and consultation, and the right to collective
bargaining and action. Article 12¹⁴⁷ is consistent with the Court’s case law.¹⁴⁸
The right to information and consultation is the only right among the three
that has already been the subject of legislation at the EU level.¹⁴⁹ The wording
of Article 27 has been subject to various criticisms. Hepple argues that the
provision fails, in the first place, to explain whether the workers’ right to informa-
tion and consultation within an undertaking is clearly a ‘right’ or a mere
objective and, secondly, it fails to determine at what level the right can be
exercised.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, the provision weakens the effective exercise of the
right by making it dependent upon Community and national law.¹⁵¹ Article 28
has gone well beyond the rights which have been recognized in Community
law;¹⁵² however, there is a lack of detail as to what the rights entail. Secondly,
the provision, parallel to Article 27, seems to suggest that the bearers of the
rights ‘workers and employers’, or ‘their respective organization’ are altern-
atives. Bercusson further criticizes the ambiguity that follows from such word-
ing because, particularly in the case of collective action, the right of workers
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¹⁴⁵ See S. Sciarra, ‘From Strasbourg to Amsterdam: Prospects for the Convergence of European
Social Rights Policy’ in Alston, Bustelo, and Heenan (eds.), above n. 118, 500–1.
¹⁴⁶ In this respect see B. Bercusson, ‘Fundamental Trade Union Rights in the European Union’
in L. Betten and D. Mac Devitt (eds.), The Protection of Fundamental Social Rights in the European
Union (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, Boston, 1996), 93–6, who argues that ‘the
prospect of trade union rights enshrined in EU law is usually said to aspire to neutrality of impact
on national systems’ (at 94). More precisely, the author argues that ‘neutrality is premised not
only on the desirability of national autonomy and trade union autonomy (vertical and horizontal
autonomy). It also implies an established balance of forces in industrial relations’ (at 95).
¹⁴⁷ According to the Explanations Relating to the Complete Text of the Charter, prepared by the
Presidency of the Convention, which drafted the Charter Art. 12(1) corresponds to Art. 11 ECHR.
¹⁴⁸ See Case C–415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL and others
v. Jean Marc Bosman and others [1995] ECR I–4921, para. 79, where the Court recognized that the
freedom of association as set out in Art. 11 ECHR is a fundamental principle which Community
law respects. See also Jacobs AG’s single Opinion in Case C–67/96 Albany International, Joined
Cases C–115/97, C–116/97, & C–117/97 Brentjens and Case C–219/97 Drijvende Bokken [1999]
ECR I–5751, para. 139, where the AG came to the same conclusion.
¹⁴⁹ See Directive 2002/14/EC [2002] OJ L80/29.
¹⁵⁰ See B. Hepple, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 30 ILJ 229–30.
¹⁵¹ See B. Bercusson, ‘A European Agenda?’ in K. Ewing (ed.), Employment Rights at Work
(Institute of Employment Rights, London, 2001), 168.
¹⁵² Compare this with the Opinion of Jacobs AG, above n. 148, paras. 158–60.
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to engage in industrial action is not stated clearly.¹⁵³ Article 28, however, may
help to shed new light on issues concerning the legislation adopted pursuant
to Article 139 EC, particularly questions relating to the representativity of the
social partners. It may also be used to exempt collective agreements from
Article 81 EC. Finally, Articles 12 and 28 of the EU Charter may contrast with
Article 137(6) EC, which denies legislative action in relation to, inter alia, the
right of association, and the right to strike and to impose lockouts. Legislation
at the European level could be adopted to solve this legal conundrum.
Notwithstanding the issues that may arise with regard to the above Articles
of the Charter, the joint reading of Articles 12, 27, 28, and 47 may, neverthe-
less, be used to argue for a less restrictive approach to the rules of locus standi
of trade associations and works councils. The Court’s case law in fact has been
incoherent, sometimes subjecting social policy to securing the functioning of
the Internal Market, particularly in the area of collective action and collective
bargaining.¹⁵⁴ In the Maurissen case¹⁵⁵ the Court defined the freedom of asso-
ciation of Community officials as a ‘general principle of labour law applicable
within the Community legal order’.¹⁵⁶ On the contrary, in Commission v.
France the Court subjected the right to collective action and freedom of asso-
ciation to the free movement of goods.¹⁵⁷ In three Dutch cases,¹⁵⁸ the Court
stated that collective agreements concluded with the aim of social policy
objectives by virtue of their nature and purpose do not fall within the scope of
EC competition rules.¹⁵⁹ Thus the Court seems to have suggested that in some
situations the social dimension per se may take priority over the economic
dimension. A deeper analysis of the rulings, however, reveals a different pic-
ture. In particular, in the Albany case the Court’s reading of some provisions of
the Treaty is subject to severe criticism.¹⁶⁰ As Vousden aptly argues, ‘the Court’s
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¹⁵³ See Bercusson, above n. 151, 170.
¹⁵⁴ See P. Syrpis, ‘Smoke Without Fire: The Social Policy Agenda and the Internal Market’ (2001)
30 ILJ 271–88. The author analyses the OMC in the light of the internal market case law, in
particular Case C–376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I–8419 (the
‘Tobacco Advertising Directive’ case). The author argues that for the new forms of governance to
have success in the long term the Court has to change its understanding of what is required for
the proper functioning of the internal market and that, in particular, differences between
Member States do not hinder the internal market.
¹⁵⁵ See Joined Cases C–193/87 & C–194/87 Henri Maurissen and European Public Service Union v.
Court of Auditors of the European Communities [1990] ECR I–114. ¹⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 20.
¹⁵⁷ See Case C–265/95 [1997] ECR I–6959. See G. Orlandini, ‘The Free Movement of Goods as
a Possible “Community” Limitation on Industrial Conflict’ (2000) 6 ELJ 341.
¹⁵⁸ See Joined Cases C–115/97 & C–117/97 Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming BV v. Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen [1999] ECR I–6025; Case C–219/97
Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven
[1999] ECR I–6121; Case C–67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds
Texttielindustrie [1999] ECR I–5751.
¹⁵⁹ See para. 60 of Albany; para. 57 of Brentjens’; para. 47 of Drijvende Bokken, all above n. 158.
See also Case C–222/98 Van der Woude [2000] ECR I–7111, para. 25, where the Court held that
a collective agreement providing for employee health insurance also benefited from the Albany
ruling, since it helped to improve the working conditions by ensuring that employees could meet
medical expenses while reducing the costs of insurance.
¹⁶⁰ See S. Vousden, ‘Albany, Market Law and Social Exclusion’ (2000) 29 ILJ 181–91. The refer-
ence to (old numbering): Art. 3 EC is made without taking into consideration the European Social
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exemption of the collective agreements from the scope of Article 81 EC
was justified on the ground that the subject matter of such agreements—
remuneration—made direct contribution to the improvement of the working
conditions’.¹⁶¹ Moreover, the ‘reasoning does not clearly distinguish between
national and European law or between national and European social part-
ners. It also implies that collective agreements do not violate competition law
if they are stipulated in the context of the traditional subject matter of collect-
ive bargaining, i.e. wage and working conditions’.¹⁶² This implies that national
measures aiming to modernize the organization of work outside these tradi-
tional patterns may fall foul of Article 85 EC.¹⁶³ Thus not only is social policy
sensu lato still subject to competition law,¹⁶⁴ but some of the objectives of the
Employment Strategy, namely those of the then ‘Adaptability’ pillar, may be
seriously undermined. The issues raised by the Albany case, namely the sen-
sitivity of Member States to social security issues and, more broadly, to social
policy, together with the diversity of labour market and IR systems; the limited
competence of the Community in this sensitive policy area, and the problems
linked to the maintenance of the principle of subsidiarity; the status of
national collective bargaining and the problems of identifying a clear border-
line between the European Social Dialogue and national social partners;¹⁶⁵
the lack of a comprehensive dialectical relationship between national and EU
social partners, and finally the difficulty of creating a continuum between
previous methods of policy-making, tradition, and new governance lead us to
the issue regarding the role of the social partners and the ‘absence’ of the EU
Parliament in the framework of new governance, which further buttresses the
need to introduce amendments to the EC Treaty.
. -     
Since the Val Duchesse Agreement the social partners have gained a quasi-
institutional role within the EU decision-making process.¹⁶⁶
Barnard¹⁶⁷ explains exhaustively the evolving role of the social partners
at both the European and national levels. In particular, she analyses the
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Fund; Arts. 117–120 EC is made without taking into account that these provisions refer to the
European social partners and not national social partners; Art. 4(1) and (2) of the Social Policy
Agreement without considering that these agreements may fall outside Art. 173 EC.
¹⁶¹ Ibid., 182. ¹⁶² Ibid., 189. ¹⁶³ Ibid., 189–90.
¹⁶⁴ See T. Hervey, ‘Social Solidarity: A Buttress Against the Internal Market Law?’ in Shaw, above
n. 7, 33–43. See also C. Barnard and S. Deakin, ‘In Search of Coherence: Social Policy, the Single
Market and Fundamental Rights’ (2000) 31 ILJ 331–45.
¹⁶⁵ A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe, Reality and Myth of Collective Bargaining in the EC
Legal Order (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000), 5 and 18–19, where the author explains the impossi-
bility of describing EC labour law as a ‘self-contained and homogeneous system of norms
endowed with an autonomous rationality of its own’, and thus the legitimization from above,
which Community bargaining enjoys, entails the use of an a contrario process in order to explain
the functional difference between the latter and national collective bargaining.
¹⁶⁶ See J. Dølvik, ‘The ETUC and Development of Social Dialogue and European Negotiations
after Maastricht’, ARENA Working Papers 97/2, available online at: www.arena.uio.no/.
¹⁶⁷ See C. Barnard, ‘The Social Partners and the Governance Agenda’ (2002) 8 ELJ 80–101.
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reasons that lead to the involvement of the social partners in the EU law and
policy-making process and the weaknesses and paradoxes of their inclusion
vis-à-vis the new governance agenda. Barnard identifies the main issues
regarding the quasi-public role of the social partners and the lack of the offi-
cial inclusion of the EU Parliament¹⁶⁸ in the European collective bargaining
system.¹⁶⁹ The issues identified are: subsidiarity, effectiveness, legitimacy, and
democracy.
As regards subsidiarity, the main contention is that the inclusion of the
social partners is an example of centralized law-making or, more aptly, a form
of ‘centrally co-ordinated decentralization’,¹⁷⁰ rather than a development of
the principle of subsidiarity in the area of social policy. In respect of effective-
ness the introduction of the social dialogue at the European level represented
one of the means of confronting the ‘sclerosis’ of the traditional legislative
process or, more critically, a way of ‘defusing’ the problem of effectiveness of
Community law.
Five Directives have been adopted by the European Social Dialogue;¹⁷¹
however, the result achieved so far has not been very satisfactory in terms of
transparency, efficiency, and output. In fact, it has not resolved important
procedural problems, e.g., the negotiations between the Social Partners on
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¹⁶⁸ For a critical analysis see L. Betten, ‘The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in
Community Social Policy’ (1998) 23 EL Rev. 20; K. Armstrong, ‘Governance and the Single
European Market’ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford, 1999),
769–70; European Parliament Resolution on the New Social Dimension of the Treaty on European
Union, A3–0091/94 [1994] OJ C77/30.
¹⁶⁹ This legislative procedure introduced at Maastricht can be summarized as follows: the
Commission consults management and labour about the possible direction of Community
action (first consultation). If it decides to proceed, the Commission then consults the social part-
ners on the content of the envisaged proposal (second consultation). On the occasion of such
consultation, the social partners may inform the Commission of their desire to negotiate an
agreement. This process, authorized by the Commission, suspends the Commission’s initiative
with regard to a specific Community action for 9 months, unless the social partners together with
the Commission decide jointly to extend it.
The EU Social Dialogue is thus based on a binary scheme procedure, which, starting with the
consultation of the social partners, may lead to: (a) strict co-operation of management and
labour with the Commission and the Council; or (b) the total or partial regulation of a specific
issue through the adoption of a collective agreement. In the latter case, collective agreements are
considered a source of law, subsidiary to the typical EU decision-making process. See Arts. 138
and 139 EC. For more details see C. Barnard, EC Employment Law (OUP, Oxford, 2000).
¹⁷⁰ See A. Ferner and R. Hyman, ‘Introduction: Towards European Industrial Relations’ in
A. Ferner and R. Hyman (eds.), Changing Industrial Relations in Europe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1998),
p. xvi; J. Weiler, ‘European Democracy and its Critics: Polity and System’ in his The Constitution of
Europe (CUP, Cambridge, 1999); Lo Faro, above n. 165, chaps. 3–6.
¹⁷¹ 3 Directives regarded the inter-sectoral level: see Directive 96/34/EC [1996] OJ L145/9, as
amended and extended to the UK, Directive 97/75/EC on parental leave [1998] OJ L10/24, which
was based on the Framework Agreement between UNICE, CEEP, and ETUC [1996] OJ L145/4;
Directive 97/81/EC on part time work [1998] OJ L14/9, which was based on the Framework
Agreement between UNICE, CEEP, and ETUC, [1998] OJ L14/9; Directive 99/70 on fixed-term
work [1999] OJ L175/43, which was based on the Framework Agreement between UNICE, CEEP,
and ETUC [1999] OJ L175/43. Two Directives concerned the sectoral level: see Directive 99/63/EC
on the organization of working time of seafarers [1999] OJ L167/33; Directive 2000/79/EC, on the
organization of working time of mobile workers in civil aviation industry, [2000] OJ L302/57. For
a detailed analysis, see Kenner, above n. 32, chap. 6.
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the content of the directives have been time-consuming¹⁷² and the whole
process is relatively ‘within closed doors’. Moreover, the number of directives
adopted so far has been rather small. Finally, the content of the directives may
be subject to criticism for the ‘dilution of the quality of rights it recognises’.¹⁷³
An important reason for the inclusion of the social partners is to increase
the legitimacy without parliamentary democracy of the EU decision-making
process in the context of social policy.¹⁷⁴ This is probably the most controver-
sial issue regarding the European Social Dialogue, which still ignites heated
debate.¹⁷⁵ This issue is strictly linked to the representativity of the European
social partners, and it highlights the fact that the quasi-public function
assigned to the latter is at odds with national collective bargaining, and more
broadly with national IR systems. In fact it has entailed a loss of autonomy of
the social partners, which historically has always typified their role in private
contractual law.¹⁷⁶ In this respect Bercusson has defined the inclusion of the
social dialogue in the EU legislative procedure as ‘bargaining in the shadow of
the law’.¹⁷⁷ Whereas in the national context ‘the development of collective
autonomy in a separate IR system, through autonomous rule-making proce-
dures and judicial bodies, has always preceded heteronomous regulation in
the supranational context supportive legislation has preceded the separate
development of collective autonomy’.¹⁷⁸
In the Communication on ‘New Procedures Introduced by the Agreement
on Social Policy and the Role of Management and Labour’,¹⁷⁹ the Commission
outlined the representativity criteria which needed to be met by the social
A Revised Framework for the EES 379
¹⁷² See C. Vigneau, K. Ahlberg, B. Bercusson, and N. Bruun (eds.), Fixed-Term Work in the EU.
A European Agreement against Discrimination and Abuse (The National Institute for Working Life
and the Swedish Trade Unions in Co-operation, Stockholm, 1999); Lo Faro, above n. 151, 115–21.
¹⁷³ See Barnard, above n. 167, 94; see also Lo Faro, above n. 151, chap. 5. Particularly interest-
ing is the distinction he introduces between ‘tied agreements’ and ‘weak agreements’ or ‘incon-
sequential agreements’. Only the former type of agreement, which is implemented via a directive
of the Council, has legal relevance in the EU, while the latter form of agreement, implemented ‘in
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the
Member States’, does not have any legal relevance at the Community level. Moreover, the imple-
mentation of the agreements by way of directives—with the agreements annexed separately to
them—has raised a series of perplexities regarding the difficulty of maintaining intact the collec-
tive autonomy part of the agreement, especially with regard to the fact that a high margin of
discretion is left to the Member States in the implementation of directives.
¹⁷⁴ See B. Bercusson, European Labour Law (Butterworths, London, 1996) 72–8.
¹⁷⁵ See Kenner, above n. 32, chap. 6.
¹⁷⁶ See Lo Faro, above n. 165, 104–8, where the author criticizes the discretion with which the
Commission assesses the outcome of the bargaining process, particularly the legality of the
agreements, which is intended to examine whether the clauses of the agreements may be con-
trary to Community law. The author argues that the Commission has arrogated to itself the ‘com-
petence to perform a purely jurisdictional role’, which pertains to the ECJ.
¹⁷⁷ See B. Bercusson, ‘Maastricht: A Fundamental Change in European Labour Law’ (1992) 23
IRJ 3. More specifically, the ‘shadow’ of the Commission weighs on the whole social dialogue
process. In this respect see Lo Faro, above n. 165.
¹⁷⁸ See B. Caruso, ‘Il Contratto Collettivo Europeo’ (1997) II Lavoro, Impresa e Societá 322–33;
see also S. Fredman, ‘Social Law in the European Union: the Impact of the Lawmaking Process’ in
P. Craig and C. Harlow (eds.), Lawmaking in the European Union (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague, London, Boston, 1998), 386, 408, and 410. ¹⁷⁹ COM(93)600, 14 Dec. 1993.
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partners in the consultation process.¹⁸⁰ Some commentators have argued that
the Commission has distinguished ‘with subtle and studied ambiguity’ the
social partners’ consultative functions from their contractual relations func-
tions by applying the above criteria only to the former.¹⁸¹ Currently, the ETUC,
CEEP, and UNICE¹⁸² have a monopoly on the intersectoral social dialogue.¹⁸³
The representativity, internal democracy, and accountability, i.e., the respon-
siveness of the social partners’ hierarchy to their members, of these three
major organizations have been contested due to their functional mode of
operation and to the degree of membership and affiliation.¹⁸⁴ These issues
were raised in the UEAPME case.¹⁸⁵ As Bercusson and Van Dijk posit, repre-
sentativity is pivotal to establishing the identity of the social partners,¹⁸⁶ and
it is thus a key criterion in the admissibility test which the CFI makes. The
salient parts of the judgment, which declared the action lodged by UEAPME
inadmissible, were the following:¹⁸⁷
—The consultation stage is different from the negotiation stage, and there is no gen-
eral right for those consulted to take part in the negotiations under Articles 3(4)
and 4 SPA¹⁸⁸ or an individual right to participate in negotiations of the framework
agreement;
—The CFI emphasized the dual nature of EC labour law. In fact the CFI stated that
in the context of the ASP, democratic legitimacy derives from Parliament’s partic-
ipation through the conventional legislative procedure under Article 2(2).¹⁸⁹
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¹⁸⁰ The criteria for organizations to be eligible are the following: (a) organizations have to be
cross-country or concern specific sectors or categories and be organized at European level;
(b) organizations must consist of organizations which are themselves an integral and recognized
part of Member State social partner structures; (c) organizations must have the capacity to nego-
tiate agreements and be representative of all Member States as far as possible; and, (d) organiza-
tions must have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the consultation
process. The list was confirmed by the Communication, Adapting and Promoting the Social
Dialogue at Community Level, COM(98)322 final, 20 May 1998.
¹⁸¹ See B. Bercusson and J. Van Dijk, ‘The Implementation of the Protocol and Agreement on
Social Policy of the Treaty of the European Union’ (1995) 11 IJCLIR 16.
¹⁸² ETUC, European Trade Union Confederation; UNICE, Union of Industrial and Employers;
CEEP, European Centre of Enterprises of General Economic Interest.
¹⁸³ See Barnard, above n. 167, 90.
¹⁸⁴ See G. Britz and M. Schimdt, ‘The Institutionalised Participation of Management and
Labour in the Community Law’ (2000) 6 ELJ 45; B. Keller and B. Sörries, ‘The New Social Dialogue:
Old Wine in New Bottles?’ (1999) 9 JESP 110.
¹⁸⁵ See Case T–135/96 UEAPME v. Council [1998] ECR II–2335. The case concerned a challenge
to the legality of the Directive on parental leave by UEAPME, which claimed to represent the
largest number of small and medium-sized employers (SMEs) at pan-European level. UEAPME’s
main contention was that since it had been involved in the first consultation procedure it should
necessarily have been involved in the second consultation process, given the fact that the inter-
ests of SMEs were different from those of UNICE.
¹⁸⁶ See Bercusson and Van Dijk, above n. 181, 12–13.
¹⁸⁷ See B. Bercusson, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law’ (1999) 28 ILJ 153–71;
see also L. Betten, ‘The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social
Policy’ (1998) 23 EL Rev. 32; M. Schimdt, ‘Representativity—A Claim Not Satisfied: The Social
Partners’ Role in the EC Law-Making Procedure for Social Policy’ (1999) 15 IJCLIR 262–3.
¹⁸⁸ Now Arts. 138(4) and 139 EC. ¹⁸⁹ Now Art. 137(2) EC.
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Under the procedure of Article 4(2)¹⁹⁰ instead the EU Parliament is not called to
participate. Democracy, which is a fundamental principle and a foundation for
the Union under Article F(1) TEU,¹⁹¹ requires that the participation of the people
be otherwise assured, in this case through the participation of management and
labour in the legislative process.¹⁹² The Commission and the Council therefore
have a duty to verify the representativity of the signatories to the agreement and
to refuse to implement the agreement if they are found to be insufficiently repre-
sentative;
—The Commission and the Council took sufficient account of the representativity
of the parties to the agreement on parental leave. The CFI insisted that the ‘col-
lective representativity’ of the parties has to be made in relation to the content of
the agreement. Since the signatories were general inter-sectoral organizations
with a general mandate they were sufficiently representative. The CFI also noted
that the interests of SMEs were adequately represented by UNICE;
—On these grounds the CFI concluded that UEAPME did not have the required indi-
vidual concern to bring proceedings under Article 173 EC.¹⁹³
The ruling is subject to criticisms on many points. First, the CFI did not assess
the validity of representativity criteria, but only whether they had been applied
correctly. It also failed to take into account the representativeness issue with
regard to those workers who are not members of trade unions. Secondly, it dif-
ferentiated between the informal consultation stage and the formal negotia-
tion stage to confirm its statement, and in doing so it implicitly endorsed the
monopoly of the three major organizations. Thirdly, and linked to the former,
the ‘CFI has favoured a narrow representation-based model of democracy,
which is concerned with the procedural rather than a wider participatory
model that legitimates on the basis of the outcomes’.¹⁹⁴ This entailed a strict
approach to the rules on standing of private associations. Fourthly, it did not
address the issue of ‘who has legitimacy to negotiate and how to balance
wider participation with effective negotiation’.¹⁹⁵
.      
Now that both the EES and the European Social Dialogue have reached
a period of consolidation abstract questions have become practical questions
which cannot be avoided if ‘new governance’ is to be taken seriously. Although
the Treaty of Amsterdam has provided a legal basis for the development of
a uniform regulation of social policy at the European level clear implementa-
tion and enforcement procedures, which guarantee compliance,¹⁹⁶ need to be
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¹⁹⁰ Now Art. 139(2) EC. ¹⁹¹ Now Art. 6(1) TEU.
¹⁹² See Bercusson, above n. 187, 164–5, The author criticizes the CFI equivalence of the EU
Social Dialogue to the EU legislative process. ¹⁹³ New Art. 230 EC.
¹⁹⁴ See Kenner, above n. 32, chap. 6. ¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 92.
¹⁹⁶ In using the term compliance I refer to the broad definition of it given by Joerges and Vos.
The authors describe compliance as including not only mere obedience to rules but also ‘reflexive
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taken into consideration. An analogy may be drawn between this situation
and Vervaele’s metaphor that ‘once the house is ready and house rules have
been determined, it becomes more and more important that those rules are
complied with and that the house will not be undermined by inferior upkeep
or operations that endanger the structure’.¹⁹⁷
As Szyszczak argues, it may well be that in the future the ECJ may be called
on to address the legality of the various processes which take place within the
EES, and that these rulings will shed light on the distribution of competence
but, as she aptly points out, issues relating to locus standi and represent-
ativeness and consultation will, ceteris paribus, still remain unsolved at the
European level.¹⁹⁸ Finally, and linked to the former, the EPGs cover policy
areas which directly affect individual rights. Although the guidelines have
normative effects there is no possibility of challenging either their validity or
the procedure with which they are adopted.¹⁹⁹ Hence, issues regarding the
protection of individual rights also need to be tackled.
My contention is that the current framework should be re-articulated,
transposing the results obtained through the EES/OMC into hard law. It must
be emphasized that although for some scholars this might appear to be one of
the most impractical reforms and to others unnecessary, it is indeed neces-
sary and particularly relevant. This would create a positive dialectical link
between the two forms of law. The proposals for reform made in section D of
this chapter do not entail a systematic review of the EU institutional frame-
work in toto but the insertion of specific procedural rules and rights, which
guarantee transparency, legal certainty, and the protection of substantive
social rights. This becomes particularly compelling in view of the enlargement
process where the accession countries present altogether different political
patterns and social and economic situations.
Following the Barcelona European Council, which called for a strengthen-
ing of the EES, the Commission issued a series of Communications. In the Com-
munication Taking Stock of Five Years of the European Employment Strategy
the Commission reviewed the experience of five years of the EES and broadly
outlined a re-design of the EES for the future.²⁰⁰ Ten topics were the subject of
the evaluation:
Prevention and policies of activation to employment;
Tax reforms and benefits;
Lifelong learning;
Social inclusion;
Administrative simplification and the self-employed;
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attitudes and a notion of co-operation; an appreciation of the distinction between command and
control types of administrative practices; and a sensitivity to the difference between interpreta-
tion of a rule and its application to a real situation’. See C. Joerges and E. Vos, ‘Structures of
Transnational Governance and Their Legitimacy’ in Vervaele (ed.), above n. 15, 71.
¹⁹⁷ See J. Vervaele, ‘Transnational Cooperation of Enforcement Authorities in the Community
Area’ in Vervaele, above n. 15, 361. ¹⁹⁸ See Szyszczak, above n. 27, 219.
¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 218. ²⁰⁰ COM(2002)416 final.
EECK-CH09.qxd  2/19/04  2:59 PM  Page 382





The Communication identified four main issues for the reform of the EES:
(a) the need to set clear objectives in response to the policy challenges;
(b) the need to simplify the policy guidelines without undermining their
effectiveness;
(c) the need to improve governance and partnership in the execution of
the strategy; and
(d) the need to ensure greater consistency and complementarity with
respect to other relevant EU processes.
The Communication stimulated an active debate. In particular, the EU
Parliament issued a resolution in which it suggested the adoption of various
measures to strengthen the EES²⁰¹ and the EMCO and the Economic Policy
Committee reached a joint position that was submitted to the Council.²⁰² The
Commission further developed the objectives outlined in this Communication
in a subsequent Communication on the future of the EES²⁰³ where it provided
examples of concrete objectives and considerations and suggestions for pos-
sible new targets.
The Commission issued a Communication on streamlining EPGs and
BEPGs²⁰⁴ with a shift towards a more medium and longer-term approach in
order to foster progress towards full employment, sustainable development,
and, more broadly, for the advancing of the European social model. From
a methodological perspective the aim of the new process is to improve coher-
ence and complementarity between the various processes and instruments,
foster the participation and involvement of the EU Parliament and the national
Parliaments, a better consultation of social partners and civil society, and
increase the transparency and intelligibility of the policy co-ordination.²⁰⁵
In line with the new and streamlined approach for the overall Lisbon
agenda follow-up, the Commission presented a Guidelines Package in April
2003 which included formal proposals of BEPGs and EPGs,²⁰⁶ the annual 
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²⁰¹ See European Parliament, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Report on the
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Taking Stock of Five Years of the European
Employment Strategy, PE 316.370 of 25 Sept. 2002.
²⁰² See Joint Opinion of the Employment Committee and the Economic Policy Committee on
the Future Direction of the European Employment Strategy, at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/
employment_social/employment_strategy/opinions2002_en.htm.
²⁰³ COM(2003)6 final.
²⁰⁴ See COM(2002)487 final, 3–8; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament, Strengthening the co-ordination of budgetary policies, COM(2002)668 final.
²⁰⁵ Ibid., 2.
²⁰⁶ For detailed information on the main implications of the proposed changes see
COM(2002)487 final, Appendix 2. For an analysis of the new guidelines see Council Decision 
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recommendations to the Member States covering a three-year period up to
2006. In particular, the guidelines are to be issued annually only if they have
to stress the importance of possible major new developments. Likewise and
consistently with the Cardiff process and pursuant to the Lisbon Strategy, the
Internal Market Strategy,²⁰⁷ which accompanies the Guidelines Package, con-
siders internal market matters until 2006 and will be subject to changes dur-
ing this three-year period only if necessary. According to the new procedures
after the June European Council has considered the current situation in the
economic and social fields, the Council adopts the BEPGs, the EPGs, the
Employment Recommendations to Member States, and/or adopts action
plans in their areas of competence. The first full application of the proposed
new arrangements for reviewing implementation took place in the autumn of
2003. As a transitional measure, however, the draft Joint Employment Report
was adopted in the autumn of 2002,²⁰⁸ instead of January 2003, as would fol-
low from the general approach of the new overall process.²⁰⁹
What follows is a first set of Treaty reforms which aim at increasing the effi-
ciency of the EU decision-making process and the effectiveness of EU law and
which revolve around the democratic legitimacy-accountability-transparency
nexus of the polity system of the European Union. I will then further develop
these proposals into specific amendments to the Treaty provisions, in particu-
lar Titles VIII and XI.²¹⁰ One caveat must be made. The problem of effectiveness
of EU law cannot be solved by ad hoc remedies but requires the implementation
of reforms regarding the whole structural and regulatory system of the
European Union. My proposals should therefore be contextualized in the
framework of the overall revision of the EC Treaty. A first set of amendments,
which should go in tandem with a series of institutional and structural
reforms, regards the systematization of the legal instruments of the European
Union by way of establishing a hierarchy of acts. The European Convention
has certainly contributed to this in the draft Constitutional Treaty.²¹¹ This
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of 22 July 2003 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States [2003] OJ L197/13
and Council Recommendation of 22 July 2003 on the implementation of Member States’ employ-
ment policies [2003] OJ L197/22.
²⁰⁷ The Internal Market Strategy has been given a 5-year time frame and its proposed actions
are reviewed each year. In addition, the next phase of the Strategy has been linked to the Lisbon
Strategy.
²⁰⁸ See Communication from the Commission to the Council, Draft Joint Employment Report
2002, COM(2002)621 final.
²⁰⁹ In Jan. 2003 the Commission presented the Report to the Spring European Council, 21 Mar.
2003, on the Lisbon Strategy economic, social, and environmental renewal. See Communication
from the Commission, Choosing to Grow: Knowledge, Innovation and Jobs in a Cohesive Society,
COM(2003)5 final.
²¹⁰ In the draft Constitutional Treaty Titles VIII and XI have been renumbered Section I,
‘Employment’ and Section II, ‘Social Policy’, of Chapter III, ‘Policies in other specific policy areas’,
of Title III, ‘Policies and Internal Action’, of Part III, ‘The Policies and functioning of the Union’. See
European Convention, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 820/1/03,
REV 1, Brussels, 27 June 2003 (01.07).
²¹¹ See Part I, Title III on the Union’s competences, Title V on the Exercise of Union compe-
tence, and Title VI on the Democratic Life of the Union of the Draft Constitutional Treaty.
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hierarchy should introduce a distinction between primary and secondary 
legislation, legislative and executive acts, and binding and non-binding legal
instruments,²¹² and also define the scope of application of the EU legal instru-
ments. Such a reform would simplify the EU decision-making process by
introducing greater efficiency, transparency, and thus responsiveness and
accountability. At the top of this hierarchy, primacy should be given to the
Treaties, followed by a set of constitutional principles, including those princi-
ples established and developed by the European Court’s case law which are
now part of primary law and a code of fundamental rights.²¹³
Secondly, there should be the regulation, the directive, and the decision. In
particular, the directive should establish the aim, the obligations, and the
conditions of the envisaged measure. Moreover, once a directive has been
adopted and within a time agreed upon during a meeting of the Council,
Member States should present reports stating how and when they intend to
transpose the act into national law. This would not only guarantee legal econ-
omy but, most importantly, it would strengthen the principle of legal certainty
and thus improve the legal protection offered to individuals. The Commission
and ad hoc committees also at the national level should supervise the whole
process of transposition into national law. The lower level of the hierarchy
should include recommendation, opinion, guideline, Green and White
Papers, action plan, agenda, declaration, resolution, and statement, which fall
into the category of non-binding legal instruments.
In this respect, the hierarchy of acts should also clearly define the scope and
the purpose of soft-law instruments, such as co-regulation, the Open Method
of Co-ordination, and the use of benchmarks and self-regulatory codes of
conduct. This would be facilitated by a strict definition of competencies.
These instruments should be used only in those policy areas where there is no
exclusive competence of the European Union or where there is a shared com-
petence between the Community and the Member States. In this regard, it
becomes necessary to amend Article 308 EC in order to eliminate the ambigu-
ity of the provision and to shed more light on when ‘action by the Community
should prove necessary’ and when the ‘Treaty has not provided the necessary
powers’. The amended provision could list a series of concrete circumstances
in which Community action might be needed, rather than simply stating ‘dur-
ing the course of the operation of the common market’. Secondly and related
to the former, Article 5 EC should be reviewed in the light of the new develop-
ments and pursuant to the idea of allocative efficiency,²¹⁴ which the principle
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See European Convention, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 820/1/03,
REV 1, Brussels, 27 June 2003 (01.07).
²¹² For a similar view, see S. Sciarra, ‘Social Values and the Multiple Sources of European Social
Law’ (1995) 1 ELJ 81. Sciarra argues that ‘There is also a need to put rules in their place and to have
a clear idea of sources and of their legal nature. This imperative must be appreciated in view of
a better understanding and enforcement of European sources in each national system, which is
also one of the aims specified in the Maastricht Treaty’.
²¹³ The EU Charter of Fundamentals Rights constitutes Part II of the draft Constitutional
Treaty. See European Convention, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV
820/1/03, REV 1, Brussels, 27 June 2003 (01.07). ²¹⁴ See also Kenner, above n. 32, chap. 6.
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of subsidiarity has been subject to over the years. The Protocol attached to the
Amsterdam Treaty in fact allows for a broader interpretation of subsidiarity:
‘subsidiarity is a dynamic concept and should be applied in the light of the
objectives set out in the Treaty. It allows Community action within the limits of
its powers to be expanded where circumstances so require’.²¹⁵ Furthermore,
the distinction between horizontal and vertical subsidiarity, which has been
defined in academia, should be included in the provision that refers only to the
distribution of competence between the Member States and the Community.²¹⁶
The inclusion of the horizontal element of subsidiarity takes into consider-
ation the new multi-tiered structure of the EU policy-making process. The
amended provision should include in paragraph 2: ‘only if and insofar as
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States, by the regional, local authorities or by organised civil society’.
A reviewed Protocol on the principle of subsidiarity should define what is
meant by ‘regional’, ‘local’ authorities, and ‘civil society’ and establish a crite-
rion for determining when to apply the revised principle of subsidiarity.
Thus these soft-law instruments should be applied to those policy areas
where consensus is difficult to achieve owing to historical, political, social,
and cultural differences between the Member States, and where harmoniza-
tion of policy at the EU level is explicitly excluded. Such has been the case in
the context of the economic co-ordination of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), in the field of social policy sensu lato,²¹⁷ in environmental pol-
icy with the ‘Sustainable Development Strategy’,²¹⁸ and, more recently, in the
area of asylum and immigration policy.²¹⁹ A clear distribution of competen-
cies is a precondition for an adequate definition of those policy areas where
soft-law instruments may be used.
Soft-law is often the precursor of subsequent legally binding decisions. It
‘smoothly’ introduces changes at the national level. It creates an expectation
that conduct of the European Union, Member States, and individuals will 
be in conformity with the non-binding rule. More precisely, ‘during the
process of creation of hard law, soft-law can have a legitimising prohibitive
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²¹⁵ See European Council, ‘Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality’, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts [1997] OJ C340/1.
See also Kenner, above n. 32, chap. 6, who argues that subsidiarity is a natural by-product of the
expansion of the Community’s competencies. As the Community’s reach expands, subsidiarity
operates as a process for managing interdependence between sub-national, national, and supra-
national actors.
²¹⁶ In this respect, the principle of horizontal subsidiarity should be given a broad meaning in
order to include the principle of proximity, which refers to forms of participatory democracy. See
Art. I–9(3) of the Constitutional Treaty, European Convention, Draft Treaty establishing a Consti-
tution for Europe, CONV 850/03, Brussels, 18 July 2003.
²¹⁷ See, above, section 1 of this chap.
²¹⁸ The ‘Sustainable Development Strategy’ is considered in the follow-up to the Lisbon
Strategy with the further inclusion of a third environmental dimension to it. See Presidency
Conclusions of the Göteborg European Council, 15 and 16 June 2001, para. 20; see also Presidency
Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council, 24 Mar. 2001, paras. 50–52.
²¹⁹ See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
the Common asylum policy, introducing an open co-ordination method COM(2001)710 final,
28 Nov. 2001.
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or prescriptive effect on state conduct before the phase of legality is reached.
The temporal element will play an important role in this regard.’²²⁰
A way of introducing a means of redress for the individual and private par-
ties, which would help to overcome the lack of legal sanctions in the pre-hard-
law stage, could be by way of Article 234 EC, i.e., preliminary ruling. In the
Grimaldi case²²¹ the Court stated that according to its interpretation of Article
177(1)(b) EC, the term ‘acts’ also includes non-binding recommendations and
opinions mentioned in Article 249 EC. More precisely, the Court said that
although non-binding legal instruments cannot have direct effect on national
courts, a national court or a tribunal is competent to refer to the Court a ques-
tion concerning their interpretation or validity. Such a reference may be appro-
priate where the recommendation or opinion fostered the adoption of a
particular provision of national law relevant to the case before the national
court or tribunal or because a recommendation or opinion casts light on the
interpretation of other provisions of Community law that are binding and rel-
evant to the case under consideration. Hence, a solution could be to challenge
a national measure adopted pursuant to a non-binding legal instrument in
domestic courts, which could refer a question to the European Court con-
cerning the interpretation or validity of a non-binding EU act. This would
allow indirect challenge to non-binding Community acts and thus help to
overcome the problem of the restrictive standing rules of Article 230 EC. In
analysing the ruling in the Grimaldi case, Klabbers posits that ‘if legally non-
binding provisions supplementing binding provisions must be taken into
account, it follows that, the language of Article 189 EC notwithstanding, those
legally non-binding provisions must for all practical purposes be treated as
legally binding. Similarly, it would seem that in situations where only applica-
ble Community provisions are cast in the form of recommendations (as was
the case in Grimaldi), those recommendations must for all intents and pur-
poses be treated as legally binding.’²²² Klabbers refers to the final sentences of
the ruling, where the Court says that national courts are bound to take rec-
ommendations into consideration ‘where they are designed to supplement
binding Community provisions’.²²³ If the Court followed Klabbers’ argument
in its case law it would certainly increase the judicial remedy for EU acts.
Finally, the accountable and transparent functioning of the EU institutions
could be improved by introducing a better system of publicity of the acts
adopted, on the modalities and procedures followed in their adoption and by
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²²⁰ See K.C. Wellens and G.M. Borchardt, ‘Soft Law in European Community Law’ (1989) 14 EL
Rev. 314. See Kenner, above n. 32, chap. 6, who argues that ‘subsidiarity has guided the exercise of
power at Community level by creating a presumption that national measures are to preferred
and, even in areas where the legal bases for Community measures have been expanded, pro-
grammatic activity or soft law should be considered as a first step’.
²²¹ See Case C–322/88 Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladie professionelles [1989] ECR 4407.
²²² See J. Klabbers, ‘Informal Instruments Before the European Court of Justice’ (1994) 31 CML
Rev. 1014 (emphasis added).
²²³ See Case C–322/88 Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladie professionelles [1989] ECR 4421 (emphasis
added).
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increasing the number of accessible EC documents. More transparency would
consequently guarantee more accountability since it could be possible to
know who does what.
.       
       
The issues examined in the previous sections lead the analysis to an import-
ant topic: the birth of a collective body of non-binding legal instruments and
how to incorporate them in the discourse of hard-law instruments.
My contention is that it is necessary to create an institutional framework in
the context of EU social policy where, according to the (revised) principle of
subsidiarity, there is a clear distribution of competence among the relevant
actors whose tasks and functions are accurately defined. This institutional
framework would have the advantage of eliminating situations of uncertainty
or any forms of institutional opacity.²²⁴ It would thus increase legitimacy, trans-
parency, and guarantee legal certainty.²²⁵ Most of the members of Working
Group VI on Economic Governance of the European Convention were in
favour of including the basic objectives, procedures, and limits of the OMC in
the Constitutional Treaty in a way which would not undermine the flexibility
of the method and which would not have the effect of replacing or circum-
venting the Community method. In addition they suggested widening the
consultation process, particularly with the social partners.²²⁶ Some members
of Working Group XI on Social Europe of the European Convention suggested
inserting a horizontal provision into the EC Treaty defining the OMC and its
procedure, and specifying that the method can be applied only where no
Union legislative competence is enshrined in the Treaty and in areas other
than those where the co-ordination of national policies is governed by a spe-
cial provision of the Treaty defining such co-ordination, i.e., Articles 99, 104,
and 128 EC or where the EU institutions have competence only for defining
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²²⁴ See D. Hodson and I. Maher, ‘The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: the Case
of Soft Law Economic Policy Co-ordination’ (2001) 39 JCMS 730–2.
²²⁵ The systematization of recent developments in the area of soft law has also been posited by
many academics. See, among others, C. Degryse and P. Pochet, ‘The Likely Impact of the IGC on
European Social Policy’, IGC Info, Observatoire social européen electronic newsletter on the
Intergovernmental Conference, 3 Nov. 2000, available online at: www.ose.be/; J. Goetschy, ‘The
Future of the European Employment Strategy’ in U. Mückenberger et al. (eds.), Manifesto Social
Europe (ETUI, Brussels, 2001); Szyszczak, above n. 32, 1139; Szyszczak, above n. 27, 203–4; Sciarra,
above n. 212, 60; N. Bruun, ‘The European Employment Strategy and the ‘Acquis Communautaire’
of Labour Law’ (2001) 17 IJCLIR 324; B. Bercusson, ‘The European Employment Strategy and the
EC Institutional Structure of Social and Labour Law’, paper presented at the SALTSA Workshop,
‘Legal Dimensions of the European Employment Strategy’ Brussels, 9–10 Oct. 2000, 16–18; on a com-
prehensive provision for collective labour law see European Parliament Committee on Employment
and Social Affairs, Report on Trans-national Trade Union, 20 Mar. 1998 (A4–0095/98), ETUC, A Legal
Framework for European Industrial Relations (1999), available online at: www.etuc.org.
²²⁶ See European Convention, Final Report of Working Group VI on Economic Governance,
CONV 357/02, WG VI 17, Brussels, 21 Oct. 2002, 5.
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minimum rules.²²⁷ In addition, the Working Group suggested that the Treaty
provision should have been incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty,
within the Chapter on the EU instruments which contains non-legislative
measures. The provision would then have defined the objectives and the basic
elements of the OMC, i.e., the identification of common targets, outcome
indicators, the establishment of a timetable for action, and the promotion of
the exchange of best practices.²²⁸ The Group also recommended introducing
some procedural rules regarding OMC implementation. In particular, the
OMC would be used each time following a decision of the Council on the basis
of a Commission proposal with the notification of the EU Parliament and the
consultation of national parliaments, regional and local authorities, social
partners, and civil society.²²⁹ Moreover, the Committee on Employment and
Social Affairs of the European Parliament has proposed that the EES/OMC
should be integrated with the national policy-making procedure, and in partic-
ular that NAPs should be adopted by the national parliament concerned on
the basis of a government bill.²³⁰
This new institutional framework is also important from an economics
perspective. In fact, ‘deeper economic integration will in addition mean that mar-
ket failures whose correction requires collective action and enforcement, will
pose problems where the collective action and enforcement are national but the
markets are European’.²³¹ One set of ideas for the creation of this new institutional
framework is to amend some of the provisions contained in Title VIII regarding
the Employment Strategy and Title XI on the European Social Dialogue.
The difficulty in creating a new institutional framework is due to the intrin-
sic difference between Titles VIII and XI. In fact, whereas Title VIII is a ‘vertical
consolidation’ of a number of years of political thinking initiated by the
Commission and often endorsed by the Member States through soft law
measures, Title XI on the contrary represents a ‘horizontal consolidation’ of
accepted judicial and political practice,²³² and it illustrates the structural
dichotomy between sensitive and non-sensitive areas of Community inter-
vention in EC social policy.²³³
As Szyszczak argues, the strict interrelationship between soft and hard 
law would guarantee the ‘rule of law’ approach,²³⁴ i.e., proper consultation,
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²²⁷ See European Convention, Final Report of Working Group XI on Social Europe, Brussels,
30 Jan. 2003, CONV 516/03, WG XI 9, paras. 41–3. ²²⁸ Ibid., para. 42.
²²⁹ Ibid., para. 45.
²³⁰ See European Parliament, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Working
Document on the impact evaluation and future of the European Employment Strategy—
Overview of technical analysis, DT\463273EN.doc.
²³¹ See I. Begg, ‘EMU and EMPLOYMENT. Social models in the EMU: Convergence? Co-existence?
The Role of Economic and Social Actors’, 5, ‘One Europe or Several?’ Working Paper 42/02, avail-
able online at: www.sbu.ac.uk/euroinst/oneeurope/papers.html.
²³² See Szyszczak, above n. 27, 197; see also E. Szyszczak, ‘The New Parameters of European
Labour Law’ in D. O’Keeffe and P. Twomey (eds.), The Treaty of Amsterdam (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 1999). ²³³ See Szyszczak, above n. 27, 203.
²³⁴ See Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, where
the Court stated that the Community is a legal order based upon the rule of law.
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transparency, and proper legal processes in creating legislation.²³⁵ Such
legislation would be subject to scrutiny and create legal rights that could be
enforceable in national legal systems through the principles of direct and
indirect effect and state liability.²³⁶
The EES must also be understood against the background of EMU. As Begg
argues, ‘the advent of monetary union reinforces the case for the EU level to
play a more extensive role in employment policy, particularly in developing
an over-arching framework within which local actors can deal with employ-
ment problems’.²³⁷ In particular, increasing the free movement of goods, cap-
ital, and labour reduces the legal restrictions for economic actors.²³⁸ National
public expenditure to finance social security systems could be ineffective
because of labour and capital mobility.²³⁹ Hence there is the need to find com-
mon strategies, which need to be implemented in the long term through
legally binding instruments.
Some first attempts to link the European Employment Strategy to EC labour
law have already been made since the Treaty of Amsterdam.²⁴⁰
In the Preamble to the European Framework Agreement on Part-time Work,
which led to the adoption of Council Directive 97/81/EC, the European social
partners stated that:
This framework agreement is a contribution to the overall European strategy on
employment.²⁴¹ Part-time work has had an important impact on employment in recent
years. For this reason, the parties to this agreement have given priority attention to this
form of work. It is the intention of the parties to consider the need for similar agree-
ments relating to other forms of work.
In the Preamble to the Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work concluded
by the European social partners, which led to Council Directive 1999/70/EC,
it is stated:
This framework agreement illustrates the role that the social partners can play in the
European employment strategy agreed at the 1997 Luxembourg extraordinary sum-
mit²⁴² and, following the framework agreement on part-time work, represents a fur-
ther contribution towards achieving a better balance between ‘flexibility’ in working
time and security of workers.
The Preamble to the Council Directive emphasizes the relevance of the
Employment Strategy, which states the following in paragraph 6:
The Council Resolution of 9 February 1999 on the 1999 Employment Guidelines invites
the social partners at all appropriate levels to negotiate agreements to modernise the
organization of work, including flexible working arrangements, with the aim of mak-
ing undertakings productive and competitive and achieving the required balance
between flexibility and security.
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²³⁵ See Szyszczak, above n. 27, 203. ²³⁶ Ibid., 203–4. ²³⁷ See Begg, above n. 231, 4.
²³⁸ Ibid. ²³⁹ Ibid.
²⁴⁰ See Bruun, above n. 225, who exhaustively illustrates and explains the relationship between
the EES and EC labour law. Some of the examples are taken from the author’s article.
²⁴¹ Emphasis added. ²⁴² Ibid.
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Moreover, in the Fixed-term Directive 99/70/EC there are also some provisions
that take into consideration the Employment Strategy. Paragraph 2 of clause
6 prescribes that, as far as possible, employers should facilitate access by
fixed-term workers to appropriate training courses in order to improve their
skills, career development, and occupational mobility. In this clause there is
an implicit reference to the then ‘Employability’ pillar of the EPGs.
The framework agreements and directives mentioned are particularly
relevant with regard to policies of the then ‘Adaptability’ pillar of the EPGs, where
the social partners have a pivotal role in the modernization of work organization
and in guaranteeing a proper balance between flexibility and security.
More recently, the new Directive 2000/43/EC on race and ethnic discrimina-
tion directly refers to the Employment Strategy as a valuable policy tool in the
promotion of minority groups in the labour market. The Preamble to the
Directive refers in fact to the EPGs for the year 2000:²⁴³
The 2000 Employment Policy Guidelines agreed by the European Council in Helsinki,
on 10 and 11 December 1999, stress the need to foster conditions for a socially inclus-
ive labour market by formulating a coherent set of policies aimed at combating
discrimination against groups such as ethnic minorities.
Directive 2000/78/EC, which establishes a general framework for equal treat-
ment in employment and occupation, has a direct link to the Employment
Strategy. In its recital it states:²⁴⁴
The EC Treaty includes among its objectives the promotion of coordination between
employment policies of the Member States. To this end, a new employment chapter was
incorporated in the EC Treaty as a means of developing a coordinated European strategy
for employment to promote a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce. The Employment
Guidelines for 2000 agreed by the European Council at Helsinki on 10 and 11 December
1999 stress the need to foster a labour market favourable to social integration by formu-
lating a coherent set of policies aimed at combating discrimination against groups such
as persons with disability. They also emphasise the need to pay particular attention to
supporting older workers, in order to increase participation in the labour force.
Paragraph 1 of Article 6 provides the following:
1. Notwithstanding Article 2(2) Member States may provide that differences of treat-
ment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the context of
national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, includ-
ing legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives,
and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
The reference to the Employment Strategy is made explicit in paragraph 25 of
the Preamble:
The prohibition of age discrimination is an essential part of meeting the aims set out
in the Employment Guidelines and encouraging diversity in the workforce. However,
differences in treatment in connection with age may be justified under certain circum-
stances and therefore require specific provisions, which may vary in accordance with the
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situation in Member States. It is therefore essential to distinguish between differences in
treatment which are justified, in particular by legitimate employment policy, labour mar-
ket and vocational training objectives, and discrimination which must be prohibited.
Finally, Directive 96/34/EC on Parental Leave implicitly refers to the then
‘Equal Opportunities’ pillar of the EPGs. In the Preamble to the Directive in
fact it states that the purpose of the Directive is to reconcile work and family
life and to promote equal opportunities and treatment between women and
men, which are all objectives of the then fourth pillar of the EPGs.
The study of the above framework agreements and directives shows that the
soft implementation of the Employment Strategy and EC labour (hard) law are
reciprocally influenced and reinforce the protection of the rights recognized
in the directives. This dialectical relationship creates a solid-based EC social
policy framework.
In addition, the above analysis shows that the boundary between soft law
and hard law is not as clear-cut as it might seem. The inclusion of sensitive
policy areas in the Community agenda in fact may be seen as a developing
process, which can be subdivided into two phases. In the initial phase, soft-
law instruments are preferable to hard law owing to the fact that these have
been areas where there has traditionally been a very narrow margin of oppor-
tunity for action at the European level or which have never been in the remit
of Community decision-making. More specifically, non-binding legal instru-
ments, as the term ‘soft’ illustrates, are a useful tool to ‘smooth’ Member States
that are often reluctant to devolve completely or partially the competence of
certain policy areas. It thus allows for the organization of activities at the
European level in sensitive policy areas such as employment, social inclusion,
and social protection. In the second phase, i.e., once the policy areas have def-
initely reached the Community agenda, hard-law instruments become prefer-
able and, therefore, the non-binding legal acts concerning a specific policy
area should be transposed into binding instruments. Directives appear to be
the most appropriate hard-law instruments because they leave a wide margin
of discretion to the Member States.²⁴⁵ It would therefore allow them to intro-
duce reforms in their national legislation according to their different welfare
state and industrial relations systems.
What follows is a series of proposed amendments to Titles VIII and XI of the
EC Treaty. In respect of Title VIII Article 128 EC should be amended in order
to include both European and national social partners. With regard to the
European social partners, Article 128(2) EC should be linked to Article 138(2)
and (3) EC.²⁴⁶
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²⁴⁵ See Goetschy, above n. 225, who endorses the view that directives would be the most
suitable legal acts to associate the Employment Strategy with the Community Method.
²⁴⁶ Art. 138(2) and (3) EC provides that: ‘To this end, before submitting proposals in the social
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Community action. If, after such consultation, the Commission considers Community action advis-
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Secondly, Article 128(2) EC should also be amended in order to enhance
the role of the EU Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the
Committee of the Regions in the adoption of the EPGs. Thus, the legislative
procedure regarding the adoption of the EPGs should be changed so that the
EU Parliament, rather than being consulted by the Council, should act together
with the Council in the adoption of the guidelines for employment. The leg-
islative route to be used would be the co-decision procedure, pursuant to
Article 251 EC. Within this context amendments should be made to the last
sentence of paragraph 2 in order to eliminate the implicit subjection of the
EPGs to the BEPGs.
Thirdly, Article 128(3) EC should be reviewed to include the participation of
the social partners in the elaboration and implementation of the NAPs at the
national level and to include the concertation between European, national,
sectoral, and enterprise social partners.
Fourthly, Article 128(4) EC should be amended in order to include the EU
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the
Regions.
The new provision in Article 128(2) EC would be as follows:
The Council acting with the procedure referred to in Article 251, and after consulting
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions and the
Employment Committee, and on a proposal from the Commission according to Article
138(2) and (3) EC, shall each year draw up guidelines, which Member States shall take
into account in their employment policies. These guidelines shall be adopted in accord-
ance with the objectives of the broad guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 99(2) EC.
To this end, the Spring European Council shall assess the implementation of both
guidelines, which are devoted to an overall social and economic strategy.
The new version of Article 128(3) EC would be as follows:
Each Member State shall provide the Council and the Commission with an annual
report on the principle measures taken, in consultation with management and labour,
to implement its employment policy in the light of the guidelines for employment as
referred to in paragraph 2. The European social partners shall provide the Council and
the Commission with a synthesis report on the principle measures taken, in concerta-
tion with the national, sectoral and enterprise social partners.
The new version of Article 128(4) EC would be as follows:
The Council, on the basis of the reports referred to in paragraph 3 and having received
the views of the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions
and the Employment Committee, shall each year carry out an examination of the
implementation of the employment policies of the Member States in the light of the
guidelines for employment. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a recommen-
dation from the Commission and after consulting the Parliament, may, if it considers it
appropriate in the light of the examination, make recommendations to Member States.
The EPGs should be amended in order to strengthen partnership on the basis
of the principle of proximity and establish an integrated approach to tackle
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social issues.²⁴⁷ This could be achieved by strengthening the role of the social
partners at all levels, but also by including the local and regional authorities
and NGOs in creating a link between the NAPs and regional (RAPs) and local
action plans (LAPs), which are emerging in some Member States.²⁴⁸ Moreover,
the EES should be linked to other Community-level initiatives such as the
‘Territorial Employment Pacts’ (TEPs), launched as pilot projects in 1997,²⁴⁹
and URBAN.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, the new regulations governing the Structural
Funds for the 2000–6 period support the EES in the local and regional dimen-
sion of the implementation of the Fund.²⁵¹ The new ESF Regulation contains
a specific provision aimed at facilitating the participation of local partners
and NGOs in the ESF and supported programmes in the form of small grant
schemes.²⁵²
Finally, with regard to the implementation of the NAPs, the meetings
between the representatives of the governments of the Member States and
officials of the Commission on the exchange of best practices and aimed at
providing feedback on the implementation of the EPGs should include repre-
sentatives of management and labour. These meetings should also be given
a formal format and the minutes of the meetings should be made public. In
this regard a new Annex to the EPGs could provide a set of procedural rules on
the organization of these meetings.
The inclusion of different levels of social partners, the EU Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, regional
and local authorities, and NGOs with the insertion of clearer procedural rules
reinforces the effectiveness of the Employment Strategy by increasing the
transparency of the process and representative and participatory forms of
democracy to the whole strategy.
Two issues still remain to be addressed: the lack of legal sanctions and the
protection of social rights, which are implicitly recognized in the EES. The
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²⁴⁷ In particular G 6 (combating emerging bottlenecks); G 13, G 14 (modernization of work
organization); G 15 (Lifelong Learning); G 17 (equal opportunities) G 18 (reconcile work and fam-
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of the Regions on ‘Strengthening the local dimension of the European Employment Strategy’,
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²⁵¹ See Communication on European Social Fund support for the EES, COM(2001)16 final/2,
23 Jan. 2001.
²⁵² Art. 4(2) of Regulation (EC) 1784/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
European Social Fund [1999] OJ L213/5 provides that Member States will allocate a reasonable
amount of Objectives 1 and 3 appropriations for global grants, managed by intermediary bodies
that will in turn support in the form of small grants the NGOs and local partnerships.
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participation of new grassroots associations and regional and local authori-
ties, with a clear set of procedural rules and rights, partially overcomes the
lack of legal sanctions. Even though some commentators may argue that this
would add further complexity to the Strategy, the increase of transparency
and, at the same time, the elimination of elitism introduce forms of direct
accountability and responsiveness of the measures and acts adopted. With
regard to the protection of social rights, which will be analysed in more detail
in the next section, one way would be, in line with Klabbers’ theory,²⁵³ to have
recourse to a preliminary ruling. A second and more effective solution would
be further to the amendments to Titles VIII and XI and in light of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, to facilitate the standing of individuals, 
private associations, namely trade associations and work councils, and public
interest groups to bring actions for annulment under Article 230(4) EC.
With regard to Title XI the proposals for reform are made taking into con-
sideration the fact that the social partners were included in the legislative
process as a regulatory tool that, it was hoped, would enhance democracy. At
the time of their inclusion, in the early 1990s, the main objective was to elim-
inate the legislative sclerosis in which the European Union found itself and
to find valid solutions to fight against the high levels of unemployment and
the social problems which it entailed. The social partners were, therefore,
called to co-operate with the other EU institutions in the EU decision-making
process. The quasi-institutional role assigned to them entailed a loss of their
autonomy, which they typically have in the context of national IR systems.
Their inclusion must therefore be contextualized in the framework of the
‘humanization’ process, which the EU institutions and particularly the Santer
Commission had initiated to promote the creation of a European Social Area.
Thus, the European Social Dialogue is to be distinguished not only from the
conventional legislative process in which the EU Parliament has a formal role,
but also from the traditional form of collective bargaining that takes place at
the national level. This explains why it was only when UEAPME challenged
the validity of the Parental Leave Directive that all the complex issues relating
to the European Social Dialogue abruptly arose. It also highlighted the restric-
tions imposed on the exercise of standing of private associations before the
European Courts.
The difficulty in overcoming this state of affairs is further increased by the fact
that any changes made may lead either to a strengthening of the Community’s
competence in the area of social policy, which would undermine the principles
of proximity and subsidiarity, or, on the contrary, to a real decision-making
power of the social partners. This latter solution, however, would find opposi-
tion from many Member States. Furthermore, the difficulty is also to guarantee
the respect of diversity whilst pursuing the Europeanization process.
This, however, is not the end of the story. Globalization and the shift
towards bottom-to-top and transnational forms of regulation have also called
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into play new actors, namely regional and local authorities and organized
forms of civil society, which are considered to be closer to the citizens and
thus, as grassroots organizations, considered better to represent the interests
and the needs of EU citizens.
The proposals for reform, therefore, do not attempt the full development of
the issues outlined above, but rather suggest some amendments, which may
help overcome the legal conundrum that the European Social Dialogue poses
to the traditional understanding of social policy.
A first set of proposals concerns the representativity of management and
labour, the role of the EU Parliament, and the better involvement of the social
partners at the European, national, sectoral, and company levels. A second set
of propositions focuses on the status of collective agreements made pursuant to
Article 139 EC and their validity erga omnes. A third set of proposals concerns
the incentive measures under Article 129 EC and Articles 136, 137, and 140 EC.
First, the representativity criteria listed in the Communication on New
Procedures Introduced by the Agreement on Social Policy and the Role of
Management and Labour²⁵⁴ should not only be amended in order to include
other social partners, e.g., sectoral and enterprise level, but they should also
be extended to the negotiation stage. In addition, they should be included in
a binding legal document, which could be a decision as envisaged in Article
249 EC. This latter amendment would in fact allow the representatitivity crite-
ria to be challenged before the European Courts.
Secondly, Articles 136–139 EC should be amended, in line with the revised rep-
resentativity criteria, in order to include a broader spectrum of social partners.
Thirdly, Article 139 EC should be amended in order to include the EU
Parliament together with the Council in the implementation of the collective
agreements. The legislative procedure to be applied would be the one envis-
aged in Article 251 EC.
Fourthly, a new paragraph could be added to Article 139 EC, which would
define the legal status of the two types of collective agreements, and in partic-
ular their erga omnes validity. This is particularly relevant since the erga omnes
validity rule is not applied in all the Member States. Linked to the former, the
provision should also specify the legal nature of the ‘decision’ of the Council,
which is not envisaged in the sense of Article 249 EC but has been interpreted
to mean any legally binding act.²⁵⁵ This is at odds with the Council power
either to amend²⁵⁶ or reject an agreement.²⁵⁷
Finally, as Bercusson aptly argues,²⁵⁸ the policy objectives prescribed in
Articles 136, 137, and 140 EC could be covered by the incentive measures
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²⁵⁴ COM(93)600, 14 Dec. 1993. The Communication, Adapting and Promoting the Social
Dialogue at Community Level, COM(98)322 final, 20 May 1998, confirmed the list outlined in the
previous Communication.
²⁵⁵ See A. Adinolfi, ‘Admissibility of Action for Annulment by Social Partners and “Sufficient
Representativity” of European Agreements’ (2000) 25 EL Rev. 171.
²⁵⁶ Pursuant to Art. 250 EC. ²⁵⁷ In accordance with Art. 202 EC.
²⁵⁸ See Bercusson, above n. 225, 12.
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envisaged in Article 129 EC. This last amendment is particularly relevant as it
highlights the common objectives of the two Titles and thus strengthens my
contention of establishing a new framework by way of linking the two Titles
together.
The Report of the High Level Group on ‘Industrial Relations and Change in
the European Union’²⁵⁹ in fact highlights the need to create a link between the
policy objectives under Titles VIII and XI and also the importance of broaden-
ing the spectrum of social partners involved in the Employment Strategy and
European Social Dialogue. It maintains that: ‘a new agenda for industrial rela-
tions should be developed at all levels in order to cope with some key priori-
ties’ and ‘build on already emerging new practices’.²⁶⁰ The High Level Group
‘acknowledging the diversity of national patterns of industrial relations, iden-
tifies some main trends: the renewal of sectoral bargaining, the decentraliza-
tion at enterprise level and local level and the role of national pacts to deal
with strategic issues. The relationship between social dialogue and civil dia-
logue is also highlighted.’²⁶¹ The new agenda is also important with regard to
the structural adaptation in the accession countries.²⁶²
Most importantly, the High Level Group suggests developing a benchmark-
ing process for industrial relations and an open method of co-ordination by
the social partners as a new action tool with the support of the newly created
European Monitoring Centre on Change (EMCC).²⁶³ The social partners are in
fact uniquely suited to the strengthening of social policy because of their
knowledge of the factual basis of various social and employment and labour
market issues.²⁶⁴ The High Level Group also stated that industrial relations can
make an important contribution to ‘good governance’²⁶⁵ promoting the imple-
mentation of the Lisbon Strategy and fostering modernization based on a new
social contract, which includes, inter alia, national pacts, European Works
Councils, and the European sectoral social dialogue. The High Level Group
outlines the way the new agenda promotes good governance in the new multi-
level framework where the industrial relations actors are developing a new
multi-level system for conducting their own affairs. This is by establishing:²⁶⁶
a relationship between the different levels (European, national, local, enterprise),
taking into account the distinction between sectoral and cross-industry industrial
relations;
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²⁵⁹ See European Commission, Employment and Social Affairs, Manuscript, Brussels, Unit
EMPL/D.1, Jan. 2002.
²⁶⁰ Ibid., 5. The key priorities are: competitiveness and innovation with social cohesion, wage
responsiveness, social inclusion, and social protection, training, and life-long learning, working
conditions and work organization, new forms of employment, working time management,
reconciliation of work and family life.
²⁶¹ Ibid. See also 29–30, where the relationship between social and civil dialogue is emphasized
in order to address new issues and problems, which have emerged more recently.
²⁶² Ibid., 32–3; 41–2. ²⁶³ Ibid., 6–7; 34–41. ²⁶⁴ See Fredman, above n. 178, 410.
²⁶⁵ The High Level Group defines it as ‘the way society organises and rules itself in order to
make and to implement choices’. See High Level Group Report, above n. 259, 24.
²⁶⁶ Ibid., 24 and 32.
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a relationship between bipartite and tripartite processes;
a relationship between different procedures (consultation, concertation, collective
bargaining, etc.) and instruments (agreements, guidelines, etc.)
In this context the European Works Councils (EWCs) play an important role as
they represent ‘networks of employees’ representatives across borders, where
local representatives are likely to meet on a regular basis’. This provides a basis
for dialogue and co-ordination of bargaining.²⁶⁷
An important distinction made in the Report is between social dialogue and
collective bargaining, the former being ‘a process, in which the actors inform
each other of their intentions and capacities, elaborate information provided to
them, and clarify and explain their assumptions and expectations’. Collective
bargaining instead is ‘a rule-making process based on joint decision-making
between independent organizations (firms, employers associations, unions
or union federations) with partly overlapping membership’. More precisely, ‘it
is an important regulatory institution of employment relations, of deter-
mining wages, working hours and the employment conditions of workers.
Through their joint authorship of the rules, negotiating parties accept joint
responsibility for the implementation and renewal of rules.’ The High Level
Group argues that collective bargaining can function better in the context of
social dialogue.²⁶⁸
The High Level Group also proposes to introduce a dialectical and political
dialogue between the European social partners and the Council on a more
regular basis. This would provide an additional incentive for national social
partners actively to participate in European social dialogue.²⁶⁹
Finally, the High Level Group invites the social partners to put forward pro-
posals for reform, including proposals to modify the Treaty.²⁷⁰
The proposals for reform put forward by the High Level Group represent
a valid response to the criticisms formulated by some commentators of the
absence in the European Social Dialogue of a direct link or interaction with
enterprise-level representatives. Bercusson, in particular, argues that ‘given
the existing links with Member States trade unions, it would strengthen the
legitimacy of EU level trade union organizations if trade union rights formu-
lated at EU level reinforced trade union representation over enterprise or
workplace-based representation’.²⁷¹ In this respect Bercusson emphasizes the
importance of the creation of the EWCs, which ‘promote for the first time
“a trans-national system of worker representation based on the enterprise” ’.²⁷²
The High Level Group Report also helps to resolve the problems of repre-
senting and protecting the interests and rights of those workers who are not
members of any trade union and of those who may be affected by actions to
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²⁶⁷ The High Level Group defines it as ‘the way society organises and rules itself in order to
make and to implement choices’. See High Level Group Report, above n. 259, 25 and 34.
²⁶⁸ Ibid., 24–5. ²⁶⁹ Ibid., 33. ²⁷⁰ Ibid., 36. ²⁷¹ See Bercusson, above n. 146, 99.
²⁷² Ibid. See also Barnard, above n. 167, 83, for whom the European Works Council Directive,
94/95/EC, poses the conditions for ‘a space for local experimentation and adaptation by enterprise-
level social partners’.
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promote social inclusion, which is not generally covered by traditional
collective agreements.²⁷³ The Report in fact gives a broad notion of industrial
relations, covering ‘not only the relations between workers and management
or between the organizations representing them, and involving not only reg-
ulation of wages and employment conditions, but also the relevant legal and
institutional frameworks and public policies’.²⁷⁴ The insertion of public poli-
cies, in particular, is very significant as it highlights the development of an
overall EU social policy agenda.²⁷⁵ In this context, Working Group XI on Social
Europe of the European Convention maintains that the role of the social part-
ners should be recognized explicitly in Title VI of the Constitutional Treaty on
democracy of the European Union.²⁷⁶
Moreover, a new Communication was issued in June 2002 to strengthen and
enhance the European Social Dialogue.²⁷⁷ This confirms and further develops
the Report of the High Level Group on ‘Industrial Relations and change in the
European Union’. It considers ‘social dialogue as a key to better governance of
the enlarged Union and as a driving force for economic and social reform’.²⁷⁸
The Communication promotes the development of an ‘autonomous social
dialogue’²⁷⁹ in line with the European social partners’ Laeken declaration²⁸⁰
and supported by the Spring European Council in Barcelona.²⁸¹ Apart from
the establishment of joint work programmes and the submission of an annual
report on their contributions, the Commission proposes to set up a new ‘tri-
partite social summit’ in the context of the Lisbon strategy.²⁸² But probably
the most important innovation is the proposal to strengthen the social part-
ners’ involvement in the open method of co-ordination, ‘including consulta-
tion of the social partners prior to the drafting of the proposal for employment
guidelines and encouraging greater use of the technical assistance available
for the social partners to enable them to report back on the implementation
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²⁷³ Ibid., 92; see also Bernard, above n. 7, 288.
²⁷⁴ See High Level Group Report, above n. 259, 9. ²⁷⁵ See Kenner, above n. 32, chap. 11.
²⁷⁶ See European Convention, Final Report of Working Group XI on Social Europe, Brussels,
30 Jan. 2003, CONV 516/03, WG XI 9, Part VII.
²⁷⁷ See Communication from the Commission, ‘The European social dialogue, a force for inno-
vation and change. Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a Tripartite Social Summit for
Growth and Employment’, COM(2002)341 final. ²⁷⁸ See COM(2002)341 final, 4 and 6.
²⁷⁹ See Framework Agreement on Telework of 16 July 2002, available online at: www.eiro.euro-
found.ie/2002/07/feature/EU0207204F.html. It will be the first European Agreement to be imple-
mented directly by the social partners themselves rather than by a decision of the Council. The
agreement will be applied within 3 years of its signature. The member organizations of the signa-
tories will report on the implementation of the agreement to an ad hoc group set up by the
signatories. This group will then prepare a joint report on implementation within 4 years after
the signature of the agreement.
²⁸⁰ For information on the content of the social partners’ Laeken Declaration of 14–15 Dec.
2001, see website, available online at: www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2001/12/feature/EU0112262F.html.
²⁸¹ Ibid.
²⁸² Ibid., 4 and 14. This will replace the Standing Committee, which is the mechanism through
which the Council, the Commission, and employers’ and employees’ organizations consult each
other and discuss the Employment Strategy, and represented a permanent forum for consultation
of the social partners and discussion on the Luxembourg Process in the framework of the EPGs
and the BEPGs.
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of the employment guidelines’.²⁸³ Thus the Communication clearly aims at
creating a link between the objectives of Titles VIII and XI. The Communication
also highlights the unique position of the social partners within civil society
‘because they are best-placed to address issues related to work and can
negotiate agreements, which include commitments’ and the importance of
strengthening participatory forms of democracy by emphasizing the import-
ance of involving all actors in decision-making.²⁸⁴ The Commission sets out
ways in which to improve the European social dialogue. It does so by suggest-
ing the setting up of an ‘interdepartmental working party’ and the drafting of
an ‘internal code of conduct’ on consultation with the social partners.²⁸⁵ Finally,
with regard to the representativeness of the social partners the Commission
partially confirms the criteria laid down in its previous Communications by
limiting their application to the consultation stage.²⁸⁶ However, it states that it
will carry out studies on representativeness ‘to cover further sectors reflecting
developments in the European economy and prepare studies on the intersec-
toral and sectoral social partner organizations in the candidate countries and
that it will present an amended list of organizations consulted under Article
138 EC. It will adjust the list again if necessary if new social dialogue committees
are set up and in the light of the results of the study on representativeness’.²⁸⁷
III. Effective Judicial Protection of Social Rights
Ekengren and Jacobsson argue that ‘it is necessary to establish a judicial
framework able to regulate and balance the fundamental competence claims
of the Union and the Member States that are the result of EU co-operation in
policies pertaining to employment’.²⁸⁸
Sciarra suggests the creation of new bodies, similar to the European Social
Charter’s Committee of Independent Experts.²⁸⁹ In this respect the Treaty of
Nice provides that the Council can set up specialized chambers to examine at
first instance certain categories of actions in specific matters and that an
appeal in cassation can be brought before the CFI against a decision by 
specialized chambers.²⁹⁰ She suggests not duplicating procedures but making
them converge towards institutional co-operation. In practice the new body
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²⁸³ For information on the content of the social partners’ Laeken Declaration of 14–15 Dec.
2001, see website, available online at: www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2001/12/feature/EU0112262F.html.
See also 14–15 and 17–18. ²⁸⁴ Ibid., 4–5, 7–8, 10–12.
²⁸⁵ Ibid., 9. ²⁸⁶ See COM(93)600 final and COM(98)322 final.
²⁸⁷ See COM(2002)341 final, 9 and 16–17.
²⁸⁸ See M. Ekengren and K. Jacobsson, ‘Explaining the Constitutionalisation of EU Governance—
the Case of European Employment Co-operation’ 15, available online at: www.score.su.se/pdfs/
2000–8.pdf. For a similar view see also Sciarra, above n. 232, 169.
²⁸⁹ See Sciarra, above n. 118, 499.
²⁹⁰ See amended Art. 220(2) EC: ‘In addition, judicial panels may be attached to the Court of
First Instance under the conditions laid down in Article 225a in order to exercise, in certain spe-
cific areas, the judicial competence laid down in this Treaty’ and new Art. 225a EC. See Treaty of
Nice, amending the TEU, the Treaties establishing the European Communities, and certain
related Acts, SN 1247/01, 42.
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should have both monitoring powers and powers to refer to the Commission
when infringements of social rights are discovered. It should be built into the
Community legal order and include representatives from other international
organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the ILO, thus enhancing
convergence of international standards.²⁹¹ Sciarra adds that this monitoring
mechanism could in exceptional circumstances lead to sanctions applied to
Member States that fail to respect fundamental social rights.²⁹²
Following Sciarra’s proposals my main contention is that, added to a new
committee, the social partners at the national, sectoral, and enterprise levels
and work councils could monitor the protection of social rights and report
any complaints to their representatives at the European level, who could
bring actions before the European Courts. An alternative solution, which
would not require the creation of a new institution, could be for the European
Court to revisit its case law on Article 230 EC.²⁹³
To date, the Court has limited the circumstances in which a non-privileged
litigant can challenge the EU institutions.²⁹⁴ The conditions created by the
Court of Justice in fact to satisfy the requirements of ‘individually and directly
concerned’ are such that individual plaintiffs or groups representing individ-
uals are for the most part restrained from challenging directly Community
measures. The restrictive approach to the rules regulating access of individu-
als and group standing has been subject to strong criticism.²⁹⁵ A very signifi-
cant change to the quality of the jurisdiction of the Court would be, therefore,
to allow citizens and, by inference, non-governmental associations and the
social partners to seek judicial review directly. Not only would this consolidate
human rights protection at the EU level, but it would also increase the means
of redress available at the national level. More specifically, trade associations
and works councils could introduce collective complaints when social rights
are infringed by Member States, as well as when insufficient action is taken. In
this context, Szyszczak suggests that a solution for recognizing the emergent
legal interests could be ‘by way of drawing parallels with the rise of third party
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²⁹¹ See Sciarra, above n. 118, 499. ²⁹² Ibid.
²⁹³ Art. 230(4) EC provides that: ‘Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions,
institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision, which,
although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and
individual concern to the former’. Cf. Art. 230(4) EC with the provisions of Arts. 33–36 ECSC,
which made it easier for citizens to challenge directly ECSC Institution measures. On 23 July 2002
the ECSC ceased to exist as its Treaty expired.
²⁹⁴ A. Arnull, ‘Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment under Article 173 of the EC
Treaty’ (1995) 32 CML Rev. 7; A. Arnull, ‘Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment since
Codorníu’ (2001) 38 CML Rev. 7.
²⁹⁵ For recent criticism by commentators, see Arnull, ‘Private Applicants and the Action for
Annulment since Codorníu’, above n. 294, 7; P. Alston and J. Weiler, ‘“An Ever Closer Union” in
Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’ in Alston, Bustelo, and
Heenan, above n. 118, 52–4; C. Harlow, ‘Access to Justice as a Human Right: The European
Convention and the European Union’ in Alston, Bustelo, and Heenan, above n. 118, 192–200; 
B. de Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human
Rights’ in Alston, Bustelo, and Heenan, above n. 118, 875–7.
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claims and recognition of limited rights, especially those of competitors, in
the competition sphere where the Court of Justice has showed a willingness to
protect certain kinds of economic interests’.²⁹⁶
However, it was not until the recent judgment delivered by the Court of First
Instance (CFI) in the Jégo-Quéré case²⁹⁷ that a less restrictive approach to the
rules of access of non-privileged litigants was applied. The CFI has taken
a more liberal approach to the concept of ‘individual concern’,²⁹⁸ and it draws
inspiration from the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in the UPA case.²⁹⁹
First, the CFI found that the option of indirectly challenging a Community
measures by way of having recourse to Article 234 EC is not always available
to individuals.³⁰⁰ National rules of standing may in fact defeat meritorious
plaintiffs without the case ever reaching the European Court.³⁰¹ And national
courts may also decide not to make a preliminary reference. Secondly the CFI
found that the possibility of claiming damages against the Community under
Articles 235 and 288 EC does not provide a solution that ‘satisfactorily protects
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²⁹⁶ See E. Szyszczak, ‘Social Policy in the Post-Nice Era’ in A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds.),
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (OUP, Oxford, 2002); see Case C–152/88
Sofrimport [1990] ECR I–2477; Case C–309/89 Codorníu v. Council [1994] ECR I–1853; Cases
T–3/93 & T–2/93 Société Anonyme et Participation Ouvrière Cie Nationale Air France v.
Commission [1994] ECR II–121; Case T–435/93 Aspec v. Commission, judgment of 27 Apr. 1995;
Case T–96/92 Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Générale des Grandes Sources and others v.
Commission [1995] ECR II–1213; Case T–12/93 Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Anonyme
Vittel and others v. Commission [1995] ECR II–1247; Case T–189/97 Comité Central de la Société
Française de Production and others v. Commission [1998] ECR II–335.
²⁹⁷ Case T–177/01 Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v. Commission, judgment of 3 May 2002, available
online at: www.curia.eu.int.
²⁹⁸ The CFI stated that ‘A natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by
a Community measure of general application that concerns him directly if the measure in ques-
tion affects his legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting
his rights or by imposing an obligation on him’. See Case T–177/01 Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v.
Commission, judgment of 3 May 2002, available online at: www.curia.eu.int, para. 51. The defini-
tion given by Jacobs AG is different. A private applicant should be individually concerned ‘where,
by reasons of his particular circumstances, the measure has, or is likely to have, a substantial
adverse effect on his interest’. Cf. Case C–25/62 Plaumann v. Commission [1963] ECR 95 and Case
C–451/98 Antillean Rice Mills, judgment of 22 Nov. 2001, available online at: www.curia.eu.int,
para. 49.
²⁹⁹ See Opinion of Jacobs AG in Case C–50/00 P, Unión de Puequeños Agricultores v. Council of
the European Union, on 21 Mar. 2002, available online at URL: http://www.curia.eu.int, paras.
33–35, 36–44, 45–49, and 59–99. In contrast to the CFI ruling given in the case and to Jacobs AG’s
proposal to change its jurisprudence, the European Court, however, has reaffirmed its case law
and rejected the action for annulment of UPA. See Case C–50/00 P, Unión de Puequeños
Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, judgment of 25 July 2002. For support for wider
access for individual applicants in other Opinions of AGs see: Opinion of Slynn AG in Case 246/81
Bethell [1982] ECR 2277, 2299; Opinions of Jacobs AG in Case C–358/89 Extramet Industrie [1991]
ECR I–2501, paras. 71–74 and in Case C–188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf [1994] ECR I–833,
paras. 20–23; Opinion of Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer AG in Case C–142/95 P Associazione Agricoltori
della Provincia di Rovigo and others [1996] ECR I–6669, paras. 40–41.
³⁰⁰ See Case T–177/01, para. 45. See Case C–321/95 Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace
International) v. Commission [1998] ECR I–1651, where the ECJ said that individuals may always
seek a remedy before national courts which may, or in prescribed circumstances must, make
reference to the ECJ under Art. 177 (now Art. 234) EC.
³⁰¹ Alston and Weiler, above n. 295, 53.
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the interests of the individual affected’³⁰² because of the intrinsic difference in
nature, purposes, and consequences between the action for annulment and
the action for damages. The CFI thus concluded that ‘the procedures provided
for in, on the one hand, Article 234 EC and, on the other hand, 235 EC and the
second paragraph of Article 288 EC can no longer be regarded, in the light of
Articles 6 and 13 ECHR and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
as guaranteeing persons the right to an effective remedy enabling them to
contest the legality of Community measures of general application which
directly affect their legal situation’.³⁰³
The ruling in the Jégo-Quéré case is extremely important; however, the new
interpretation of ‘individual concern’ is not per se of great benefit to the pro-
tection of collective rights and more particularly to trade unions, works coun-
cils, and public interests groups.
Problems in fact still remain with regard to the term ‘direct concern’ in
Article 230(4) EC. Direct concern normally requires the existence of a causal
link between the act and the effects on the applicant. Two factors are taken
into consideration: whether there has been the intervention of a discretionary
power and the nature of the effect of a given measure on the plaintiff. In one
of the Nestlé/Perrier cases³⁰⁴ the CFI stated that bodies representing employ-
ees concerned about social consequences of concentration of various com-
panies authorized by a Commission’s decision were not directly concerned by
that decision because ‘only a decision which may have an effect on the status
of the employees’ representative organizations or on the exercise of the 
prerogatives and duties given to them by the legislation can affect such 
organizations’ own interest’.³⁰⁵
The Jégo-Quéré ruling may favour the access of group applicants; however,
the requirement of direct effect may be problematic if the latter cannot show
that their rights³⁰⁶ have not been affected by a Community measure. In fact
since the interests protected by such associations, i.e., of those whom they
represent, are not relevant to determine whether there is ‘direct concern’
these non-privileged parties would not stand the direct concern test.³⁰⁷ The
joint reading of Articles 12, 27, 28, and 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights in tandem with Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR could be used to argue
for a new and more liberal interpretation of ‘direct concern’ and could, there-
fore, guarantee the wider access of trade associations and work councils to
the Community Courts.
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³⁰² See Case T–177/01, Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v. Commission, judgment of 3 May 2002, available
online at: www.curia.eu.int, para. 46. ³⁰³ Ibid., para. 47.
³⁰⁴ See Case T–96/92 Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Générale des Grandes Sources and
others v. Commission [1995] ECR II–1213.
³⁰⁵ See ibid., para. 38. See also Case T–12/93 Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Anonyme
Vittel and others v. Commission [1995] ECR II–1247; Case T–189/97 Comité Central de la Société
Française de Production and others v. Commission [1998] ECR II–335. For further analysis of this
case law see Arnull, above n. 294, 25–30. ³⁰⁶ i.e., procedural rights.
³⁰⁷ See Case C–321/95 Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) v. Commission
[1998] ECR I–1651.
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Finally, the Treaty of Nice,³⁰⁸ which introduces more flexibility in the process-
ing and allocation of cases,³⁰⁹ and the further amendments of the Community
Court’s Rules of Procedures,³¹⁰ which include the accelerated treatment of
cases, provide the European Courts with further effective means to face the
excessive volume of applications in view of the enlargement process. These
amendments could also foster a less restrictive approach to Article 230(4) EC.
IV. Conclusion
In this chapter I showed how the political discourse on EU governance has
now definitely reached the top of the agenda of the European Union. The
analysis undertaken so far shows that the evolution of EU governance in the
field of social policy raises crucial constitutional questions. The new trans-
national and multi-tiered modes of governance in fact lack institutional fora
through which the main actors in civil society may develop forms of repre-
sentative participation. New sources of law are created with different and
often uncertain legal effects, particularly with respect to the acquis commu-
nautaire. Moreover, the EU system does not provide effective legal remedies
to protect the new rights to consultation and involvement in the decision-
making system. Hence most commentators, including the European institu-
tions, agree on the need to introduce some changes in order to overcome the
Community’s structural inadequacy and legislative sclerosis to confront the
new regulatory problems. The study has also revealed that there are mainly two
schools of thought. Some scholars argue that the amendments to the EC Treaty
should focus mainly on the extant institutional design by strengthening the EU
Community method and the European Social Dialogue; another school of
thought, on the contrary, focuses on the emergence of the new trans-national
political actors and on a functional representation of the citizens and calls for
the introduction of participatory or associative democracy by structuring
group-based interest associations within the EU decision-making process.³¹¹
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³⁰⁸ The CFI becomes the common law judge for all direct actions, particularly proceedings
against a decision (Art. 230 EC), action for failure to act (Art. 232 EC), action for damages (Art. 235
EC), with the exception of those which will be allocated to a specialized chamber and those the
statute reserves for the Court itself. See amended Art. 225 EC. See the Treaty of Nice, amending
the TEU, the Treaties establishing the European Communities, and certain related Acts, SN
1247/01, 45–6. The ECJ retains responsibility for other proceedings, particularly actions for fail-
ure to fulfil obligations (Art. 226 EC), but the statute can entrust to the CFI categories of proceed-
ings other than those listed in Art. 225 EC. The idea is to maintain within the Court, as the
jurisdictional supreme body of the EU, disputes concerning essential Community issues. See new
Art. 229a EC and amended Art. 230 EC. See Treaty of Nice, amending the TEU, the Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities, and certain related Acts, SN 1247/01, 48–9.
³⁰⁹ See also ECJ and CFI, ‘The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union, Proposals
and Reflections’, available online at: curia.eu.int/en/txts/intergov/ave.pdf.
³¹⁰ See amended CFI Rules of Procedure [2000] OJ L322/1 and ECJ Rules of Procedure [2000] OJ
L122/43.
³¹¹ i.e., representation based on social and economic lines rather than territoriality. Art. I–46 of
the Constitutional Treaty, above n. 216.
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I thus suggested a series of amendments to Titles VIII and XI of the EC Treaty,
which aim to improve the effectiveness of the EU decision-making system³¹²
by way of combining these two schools of thought.
Finally, I showed how there is reciprocal influence between the EES and EC
labour law and between the European Court’s case law and the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights.
The proposals made are in line with the processes of consolidation taking
place in EC labour law and constitutionalization enacted by the European
Court of Justice.
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³¹² For a meaning of effectiveness see F. Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community
Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’ (1993) 56 MLR 25–6.
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